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A Regulatory and Economic Perplexity:  
Bitcoin Needs Just a Bit of Regulation 
Daniela Sonderegger

 
[T]here is something special about Bitcoin that makes it 
inherently resistant to government control. It is built on code. 
It lives in the cloud. It is globalized and detached from the 
nation state, has no own institutional owner, operates peer to 
peer, and its transactions are inherently pseudonymous. It 
cannot be regulated in the same way as the stock market, 
government currency markets, insurance, or other financial 
sectors. 
—Jeffrey Tucker1  
INTRODUCTION 
Set aside all of the legal and regulatory parameters and simply 
take a moment to imagine a world that functions on a single 
digitalized currency, regulated not by a central authority, but rather 
by the individual users who take part in the system. Imagine being a 
businessperson, with back-to-back meetings across the globe. 
Wouldn’t it be nice if instead of stopping at the currency exchange in 
each country or having to notify your bank of your travels, you could 
simply walk off the plane and go to your favorite coffee shop or 
restaurant and pay by having the storeowner scan a code on your 
 
 
 J.D. Candidate (2015), Washington University School of Law; B.A. (2012), Lehigh 
University. I would like to thank Carlos Valenciano, for suggesting this topic and supporting 
my initial investigation into the issue, as well as Gary Kalbaugh, who kindly offered insightful 
comments and helped improve gaps in my analysis. A special thanks to my parents, who have 
supported me throughout my legal education and through this Note writing process. And 
finally, thank you to all Journal staff members for their hard work and thoughtful edits, without 
which this Note would not have come to fruition.   
 1. Jeffrey Tucker, Should Bitcoin be Regulated like Dollars, LAISSEZ FAIRE (May 20, 
2013), http://lfb.org/today/should-bitcoin-be-regulated-like-dollars/.  
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phone? Bitcoin, a new decentralized peer-to-peer digital currency, 
aspires to achieve this kind of borderless world.  
More than a technological innovation or a view of the future, 
Bitcoin is poised to threaten the very foundation upon which fiat 
currency
2
 and monetary policy rest: centralized control. Bitcoin is 
unnerving precisely because “a world where it [is] used for all 
transactions is one where the ability of a central bank to guide the 
economy is destroyed, by design.”3 
Bitcoin was developed during a time in which the Federal Reserve 
plunged into an unprecedented period of monetary intervention to 
stave off a financial crisis that many argue was brought about by 
risky, unregulated investments;
4
 a world in which the Cyprus banking 
crisis
5
 propelled that country into a deep recession;
6
 and a world 
where Greece, Spain, and Italy have fallen into economic misery.
7
 It 
is this mistrust of governmental authorities during these 
unprecedented times that has spurred interest in Bitcoin.
8
  
 
 2. Fiat currency is money that a government has designated as the legal tender. However, 
fiat currency is intrinsically valueless and is not backed by any physical commodity. 
Consequently, it derives its value from supply and demand and the faith its users place on its 
value. Fiat Money, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fiatmoney.asp (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2014).  
 3. Alex Hern, Is Bitcoin About to Change the World?, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/25/isbitcoin-about-to-change-the-world-peer 
-to-peer-cryptocurrency-virtual-wallet.  
 4. See generally THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT xvi (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf 
(“[I]t was the collapse of the housing bubble—fueled by low interest rates, easy and available 
credit, scant regulation, and toxic mortgages—that was the spark that ignited a string of events, 
which led to a full-blown crisis in the fall of 2008.”). Note that this document is a partisan, 
rather than a bipartisan document as the two Republican appointees dissented. Id. at viii.  
 5. Bitcoins became popular in Cyprus when the government threatened to tax anyone 
with a bank account by at least 6.75%. Felix Salmon, The Bitcoin Bubble and the Future of 
Currency, MEDIUM, https://medium.com/money-banking/2b5ef79482cb (last updated Nov. 27, 
2013). Bitcoins became a preferable choice in this situation because the government could not 
confiscate them nor prevent individuals from transporting them outside of the country. Id.  
 6. See Cyprus: 2014 Article IV Consultation Concluding Statement of the IMF Mission, 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (July 30, 2014), http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2014/ 
073014.htm.  
 7. See, e.g., Bob Chapman, Europe’s Economic Crisis, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Mar. 14, 
2012), http://www.globalresearch.ca/europe-s-economic-crisis-portugal-ireland-spain-italy-and-
belgium-are-heading-in-the-same-direction-as-greece/29766.  
 8. Salmon, supra note 5.  
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Bitcoin has essentially turned the mistrust of existing financial 
institutions into a philosophy.
9
 It is the first decentralized digital 
currency (meaning it has no central regulatory entity).
10
 Hailed the 
ultimate alternative to the global banking system, Bitcoin is a 
payment system that allows international transactions to take place at 
any hour, in any place, at a very low cost.
11
 Politically, Bitcoin seeks 
to separate money from the state’s regulatory power.12 Elizabeth 
Ploshay, a writer for Bitcoin Magazine describes it as “‘[A] 
movement’—a crusade in the costume of a currency. Depending on 
whom you talk to, the goal is to unleash repressed economies, to take 
down global banking or to wage a war against the Federal Reserve.”13 
Others have described Bitcoin as a victory for individuals who 
seek payment transactions without barriers and surveillance.
14
 Bitcoin 
represents an opportunity for countries without a developed financial 
sector to send and receive payments without barriers and excessive 
remittance
15
 fees.
16
 These reduced transaction costs can encourage 
small value transactions that will aid in the development of small 
businesses and can provide financial access to nations with 
underdeveloped financial sectors.
17
  
 
 9. Alan Feuer, The Bitcoin Ideology, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/12/15/sunday-review/the-bitcoin-ideology.html.  
 10. How Does Bitcoin Work?, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 2013), http://www.economist.com/ 
blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-how-does-bitcoin-work.  
 11. Feuer, supra note 9. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Jon Matonis, Bitcoin Ideology and the Tale of Casascius Coins, FINANCIAL SENSE 
(Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/jon-matonis/bitcoin-ideology-
casascius-coins.  
 15. Remittance is defined as “The process of sending money to remove an obligation. 
This is most often done through an electronic network, wire transfer or mail. The term also 
refers to the amount of money being sent to remove the obligation.” Remittance, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/remittance.asp (last visited Aug. 24, 
2014).  
 16. See Inside Bitcoins Panel—Moving Bitcoin Forward, COINSIDER THIS! (Dec. 30, 
2013), http://www.coinsiderthis.com/tag/regulation/ (stating that Bitcoins would benefit 
emerging markets such as Africa and Asia by circumventing high remittance costs in 
international payments).  
 17. Id.  
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Skeptics see Bitcoin as a questionable economic scheme wrapped 
up in a of libertarian political agenda.
18
 They think Bitcoin users and 
believers are disconnected from the world’s financial problems and 
lack an understanding of the central bank’s role.19 What is worse is 
that many view Bitcoin as a safe-haven for criminal activity.
20
  
The truth may lie somewhere in between. The fact of the matter is 
that Bitcoin has evolved into a powerful, disruptive payment 
system.
21
 Governments around the world, threatened by Bitcoin’s 
ideological underpinnings but awed by its technological potential, 
find themselves in somewhat of a dilemma
22
 On the one hand, 
regulation seems necessary.
23
 On the other, Bitcoin rejects centralized 
control and exists exclusively on the Internet, meaning that true, 
effective regulation can exist only through worldwide cooperation,
24
 
which is costly, not to mention highly complex.  
Presently, many merchants around the world accept Bitcoin as 
currency.
25
 Furthermore, the US government has not prohibited the 
 
 18. See, e.g., Alex Payne, Bitcoin, Magical Thinking, and Political Ideology, AL3X.NET 
(Dec. 18, 2013), https://al3x.net/2013/12/18/bitcoin.html. 
 19. Id.  
 20. See generally DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, FED. BUREAU OF INVEST., (U) 
BITCOIN VIRTUAL CURRENCY: UNIQUE FEATURES PRESENT DISTINCT CHALLENGES FOR 
DETERRING ILLICIT ACTIVITY 2 (2012), available at http://www.wired.com/Images_blogs/ 
threatlevel/2012/05/Bitcoin-FBI.pdf [hereinafter FBI INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT] (“Bitcoin 
will likely continue to attract cyber criminals who view it as a means to move or steal funds as 
well as a means of making donations to illicit groups. If Bitcoin stabilizes and grows in 
popularity, it will become an increasingly useful tool for various illegal activities beyond the 
cyber realm.”).  
 21. Feuer, supra note 9.  
 22. See Ofir Beigel, Bitcoin Worldwide Legal and Adoption Status, 99 BITCOINS (Dec. 30, 
2013), http://99bitcoins.com/bitcoin-worldwide-adoption-status/.  
 23. See generally Walter Frick, Why Bitcoin Entrepreneurs are Begging for more 
Regulation, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Mar. 26, 2014), http://blogs.hbr.org/2014/03/why-bitcoin-
entrepreneurs-are-begging-for-more-regulation/ (noting that regulatory uncertainty is holding 
back Bitcoin development).  
 24. See Tim Davaney, Carper: Bitcoin Should ‘Lead Way’ in Bitcoin Regulation, THE 
HILL (Feb. 3, 2014), http://thehill.com/regulation/legislation/197310-carper-us-should-lead-
way-in-bitcoin-regulation (‘This report underscores that Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are 
present and growing in major economies, supporting the call for increased global 
cooperation.’). 
 25. See, e.g., Mark Macdonald, 75 Places to Spend Your Bitcoin, ECOMMERCE MKTG. 
BLOG (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.shopify.com/blog/10480345-75-places-to-spend-your-
bitcoins#axzz2qgOw8kl5 (listing retailors that accept Bitcoins).  See also Pete Rizzo, Bitcoin 
Micropayments Get Big Moment as Chicago Sun-Times Paywall Experiment Goes Live, 
COINDESK (Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.coindesk.com/micropayments-chicago-sun-times-paywall-
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currency and some within the government have recognized the value 
of the technology.
26
 Despite wider acceptance, Bitcoin is not yet fully 
understood and continues to exist under extreme regulatory 
uncertainty.
27
  
This Note analyzes Bitcoin and ultimately proposes a short-term 
solution to Bitcoin’s regulatory uncertainty: one that aims to balance 
the government’s interest in regulation and Bitcoin’s very rejection of 
central authority. Part I of this Note introduces Bitcoin, including an 
analysis of Bitcoin’s strengths and weaknesses for mainstream 
adoption. Part II presents the current regulatory landscape and 
analyzes the possible classifications and regulations under which 
Bitcoin could potentially fall. Finally, Part III of this Note proposes 
that the US government’s best alternative to regulating Bitcoin is 
something shy of full-fledged regulation. Instead, this Note argues 
that Bitcoin should be allowed to function within a loosely defined 
legal framework and permitted to develop with only a minimal 
degree of governmental intervention.  
I. HISTORY  
A. Bitcoin and the Future of Digital Currencies 
Bitcoin is the world’s first decentralized currency that is not 
linked to any real world currency or commodity.
28
 Bitcoin refers both 
to the Bitcoin Payment System (Bitcoin), which is a peer-to-peer 
network that does not rely on any central government authority to 
 
live/ (noting that the Chicago Sun-Times, the ninth largest newspaper in the US, is the first 
major US publication to accept Bitcoins).  
 26. See Bitcoin Hits New Heights as US Lends Legitimacy to Virtual Currencies in 
Hearing, RT (Nov. 19, 2013), http://rt.com/usa/bitcoin-legitimate-senate-hearing-931/.  
 27. See generally Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, United States: Bitcoin: Current US 
Regulatory Developments, MONDAQ (Nov. 28, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/ 
277850/Financial+Services/Bitcoin+Current+US+Regulatory+Developments (exploring Bitcoin’s 
legal framework in the United States and describing Bitcoin’s lack of legal classification for 
regulatory purposes). But see infra note 171 (determining Bitcoin is property for tax purposes).  
 28. See EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES 21 (2012), available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf.  
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function,
29
 as well as the denomination of the currency (bitcoin).
30
 
The Bitcoin payment system relies on a collective network that 
issues, transacts, processes and verifies all bitcoin transactions.
31
 This 
process is termed a “proof-of-work system.”32 Each time a transaction 
occurs, users must solve a mathematical puzzle to verify the 
transaction.
33
 Once it is verified, the transaction is recorded within 
the network on what is called a “block-chain.”34  
The purpose of the Bitcoin payment system, according to the 
founder of Bitcoin, Satoshi Nakamoto,
35
 is to overcome today’s “trust 
based model.”36 Nakamoto authored a paper when he launched 
Bitcoin describing the weaknesses of today’s so-called “trust model,” 
which relies on trusted third party financial institutions to process 
payments.
37
 Inherent in Nakamoto’s argument is a critique of the 
reversibility of current transactions.
38
 Trusted third parties are unable 
to avoid mediating disputes or guarantee finality in each payment, 
which inevitably increases users’ transaction costs.39 The possibility 
of reversal heightens the need for trust and causes a certain level of 
fraud to become acceptable in the system.
40
 
 
 29. DANIELLE DRAINVILLE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE BITCOIN ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM 
10 (2012), available at https://math.uwaterloo.ca/combinatorics-and-optimization/sites/ca. 
combinatorics-and-optimization/files/uploads/files/Drainville,%20Danielle.pdf. 
 30. See David Bergstein, Understanding Bitcoin, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/david-bergstein/understanding-bitcoin_b_5451488.html (last updated Aug. 
5, 2014).  
 31. Investopedia Staff, How Bitcoin Works, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.forbes. 
com/sites/investopedia/2013/08/01/how-bitcoin-works/.  
 32. DRAINVILLE, supra note 29, at 10, 13–15.  
 33. See Richard Satran, How did Bitcoin Become a Real Currency?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT (May 15, 2013), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/2013/05/ 
15/how-did-bitcoin-become-a-real-currency. This process is called “mining,” and will be 
further described in the body of the note. See infra notes 51–56 and accompanying text. 
 34. Satran, supra note 33.  
 35. See Alec Liu, Who is Satoshi Nakamoto, The Creator of Bitcoin?, MOTHERBOARD 
(May 22, 2013), http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/who-is-satoshi-nakamoto-the-creator-of-
bitcoin (“The name Satoshi Nakamoto is believed to be a pseudonym for a person, a group, or 
even a larger, possibly governmental organization.”).  
 36. See SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER TO PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM 1, 
available at http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. The use of third parties also limits minimal practical transaction size and cuts off 
the possibility of small casual transactions. Id.  
 40. Id.   
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/14
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A better system, Nakamoto argues, is based on cryptographic 
proof that allows any two parties to transact with each other without 
the need for a trusted third party.”41 Transactions that are 
computationally impractical to reverse, Nakamoto argues, will 
protect sellers against fraud and eliminate the need for third parties.
42
 
Bitcoin, at its core, is therefore a payment system or a platform 
through which payments can be made.
43
  
The Bitcoin system overcomes a need for third party intervention 
mainly through a combination of a process called mining and a 
shared public ledger (the block-chain).
44
 The shared public ledger is a 
block-chain, which chronologically records every transaction in the 
system, and forms the backbone of the Bitcoin verification network.
45
 
Every time a transaction is confirmed, it is included in the block-
chain and recorded on every node, or in other words, on every 
computer, in the Bitcoin network.
46
  
To ensure both privacy and validity, each Bitcoin user has a secret 
private key used to sign the transactions. Each user also has a public 
key or account number that is visible to other users.
47
 The signature 
provides a mathematical proof that the transaction has come from a 
particular Bitcoin user, and it prevents the transaction from being 
 
 41. Id. This system is particularly appealing within the current context of global financial 
turmoil because it is these very trusted third parties that brought about the crises with what 
many would consider to be their reckless behaviors. Salmon, supra note 5.  
 42. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 36, at 1. It is noteworthy that Bitcoin’s irreversibility 
protects against charge-back fraud rather than fraud in general. Vatalik Buterin, Bitcoin and 
Consumer Economies in the non-Western World, BITCOIN MAGAZINE (Mar. 5, 2012), 
http://bitcoinmagazine.com/340/bitcoin-and-consumer-economies-in-the-non-western-world/. 
Merchants who accept credit card payments are always on the hook for payment reversals, 
called chargebacks, from customers who claim that the product was never delivered. Id. 
Merchants who wish to dispute the claim must bear the cost of a formal dispute process. Id. 
Bitcoin’s irreversibility therefore protects merchants from the misuse of customer charge-backs, 
more so than from other types of fraud. Id.   
 43. See Marc Andreessen, Why Bitcoin Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/why-bitcoin-matters/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 
(noting that Bitcoin’s value is derived from its use as a payment system where people can trade 
in the currency at any time and in any place with little to no fees involved). 
 44. NAKAMOTO, supra note 36, at 3.  
 45. How Does Bitcoin Work?, BITCOIN, http://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2014).  
 46. Id.  
 47. EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, supra note 28, at 23.  
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altered once it has been issued.
48
 Each transaction, as briefly 
mentioned above, is verified through a distributed consensus system 
(or proof of work system) called mining.
49
 
Mining essentially entails solving a series of complex 
mathematical puzzles that create additional blocks in the block-
chain.
50
 Because Bitcoin is decentralized and lacks a verifying 
centralized authority, Bitcoin transactions are confirmed through this 
mining process.
51
 In order to incentivize the verification process, 
which is costly because it requires a lot of computing power, those 
who participate in the verification process
52
 and who first 
successfully solve the mathematical puzzle are rewarded with a 
certain amount of bitcoins.
53
 The system therefore protects the 
neutrality of the network by allowing different computers to agree on 
the state of the system and also making repudiation of transactions 
impossible.
54
 Therefore, Bitcoin relies on the public network to 
circumvent the use of third party financial institutions.
55
  
 
 48. How Does Bitcoin Work?, supra note 45.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Jan Reess–Alaric, Making Sense of Bitcoin—Part 1, FINEXTRA (Aug. 16, 2013), 
http://www.finextra.com/community/fullblog.aspx?blogid=8039.  
 51. See Adam Levitin, The Behavioral Economics of Bitcoin, CREDIT SLIPS (Jan. 11, 
2014), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/01/the-behavioral-economics-of-bitcoin. html.  
 52. Id.  
 53. Jan Reess-Alaric, supra note 50. Currently, the system that solves the puzzle gets 
twenty-five Bitcoins. Ashlee Vance & Brad Stone, The Bitcoin-Mining Arms Race Heats Up, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-
09/bitcoin-mining-chips-gear-computing-groups-competition-heats-up. Every four years the 
number of Bitcoins awarded per validated transaction is reduced by 50 percent. The generation 
of Bitcoins in circulation is capped at 21 million, meaning that after 21 million Bitcoins are 
mined, no new Bitcoins can be created. EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, supra note 28, at 24–25 
(noting that approximately six new Bitcoins are created every hour, but because of the cap and 
the geometric decrease, the number of Bitcoins in existence will reach 21 million around the 
year 2040). Purchased or mined Bitcoins are stored on the user’s computer in a digital wallet or 
using an online wallet service. CRAIG K. ELWELL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43339, 
BITCOIN: QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43339.pdf.   
 54. Through the mining process, that is, packaging each transaction into blocks that abide 
by strict cryptographic rules, computers on the network have a public, chronological record of 
each transaction. How Does Bitcoin Work?, supra note 45. These cryptographic rules “prevent 
previous blocks from being modified because doing so would invalidate all following blocks. 
Mining also creates the equivalent of a competitive lottery that prevents any individual from 
easily adding new blocks consecutively in the block chain. This way, no individuals can control 
what is included in the block chain or replace parts of the block chain to roll back their own 
spends.” How Does Bitcoin Work?, supra note 45; But see infra note 138 and accompanying 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/14
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B. Bitcoin Advantages 
As a form of new and innovative digital currency and payment 
system, Bitcoin presents a number of attractive features both for its 
users and for potential mainstream adoption. 
First, Bitcoin excels at addressing counterfeiting. In the digital 
currency environment, counterfeiting is known as the double-
spending problem, which means using the same currency twice.
56
 
Financial intermediaries have been set up to guarantee that no party 
will attempt to double spend a currency.
57
 Bitcoin, however, has 
successfully circumvented this intermediary through its block-
chain.
58
 The sheer computational force required to alter the block- 
chain,
59
 together with the chronological recording of each transaction 
engrained in the public ledger on each computer in the network 
ensures that the same coin cannot be spent twice.
60
  
Because costs associated with currency exchange rates and other 
governmental barriers are avoided, Bitcoin enables small value 
transactions, which facilitate e-commerce and international trade.
61
 
 
text. As such, mining protects against double spending because the process of block creation 
and the recording of each block on the public ledger will ultimately show that user one sent his 
bitcoins to user two before sending those very same coins to user three, ensuring that only two’s 
ownership of the bitcoins is verified in the public ledger. Adam Levitin, supra note 51.  
 55. How Bitcoin Mining Works, COINDESK, http://www.coindesk.com/information/how-
bitcoin-mining-works/ (last updated Mar. 6, 2014).  
 56. Thomas Lowenthal, Bitcoin: Inside the Encrypted, Peer-to-Peer Digital Currency, 
ARS TECHNICA (June 8, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/06/bitcoin-inside-the-
encrypted-peer-to-peer-currency/.  
 57. Joshua J. Doguet, The Nature of the Form: Legal and Regulatory Issues Surrounding 
the Bitcoin Digital Currency System, 73 LA. L. REV. 1119, 1128 (2013).  
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. A tremendously powerful computer is needed mainly because the computer has to 
process and store a large and ever growing blockchain, as nodes are added to the chain every 10 
minutes. How does Bitcoin Work?, supra note 10.    
 60. Adam Levitin, supra note 51.  
 61. Lauren Orsini, Why Small Businesses Have the Most to Gain from Bitcoin, 
READWRITE (Nov. 6, 2013), http://readwrite.com/2013/11/06/why-small-businesses-have-the-
most-to-gain-from-bitcoin#awesm=~osLaDuMl6petRE. Bitcoin is the first currency that can be 
used for micropayments because bitcoins are divisible to such a great extent: currently down to 
eight decimal places after the point. Andreessen, supra note 43. Consequently, very small, 
arbitrary amounts of money can be sent to anyone in the world at almost no cost. Id. Bitcoin 
also facilitates trade because it is a “censorship resistant currency,” meaning the government 
cannot tell the users where and how to spend their bitcoins because there is no central 
regulatory authority. Future Money Trends, Bitcoin is the Universal Glue & Open Transactions 
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These reduced costs mean the currency can be used in any transaction 
around the world to encourage the development of small businesses 
and allow very small-scale payments to become prominent.
62
 The 
Bitcoin’s design makes it ideal as the lingua franca of commerce 
conducted online.
63
 Bitcoin’s global reach could potentially aid 
developing markets by connecting people without access to bank 
accounts to the world economy.
64
  
Moreover, some have argued that Bitcoin is particularly appealing 
because the value cap, set at twenty-one million, prevents inflation.
65
 
When that amount is reached, no more bitcoins will ever be created.
66
 
Theoretically, this should keep inflation low and thereby place 
investment and spending on surer ground.
67
 Furthermore, if Bitcoin 
were to be widely accepted, its capping mechanism would prevent 
governments from saturating financial markets with bitcoins simply 
because they think the market needs more money.
68
   
 
is the Future, Chris Odom Interview, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=Vfhbjkge4fs (begin at 1:24).  
 62. Orsini, supra note 61 (quoting Jerry Brito, “With Bitcoin, you don’t need permission 
to start accepting it. And fees [which go to Bitcoin miners, to help run the network] are less 
than one percent.”).  
 63. Salmon, supra note 5 (“Bitcoin was designed . . . to be, in effect, the lingua franca of 
online commerce.”).  
 64. Jeff Fong, Bitcoin Price 2013: How Bitcoin Could Help the World’s Poorest People, 
POLICY MIC (May 14, 2013), http://www.policymic.com/articles/41561/bitcoin-price-2013-
how-bitcoin-could-help-the-world-s-poorest-people. People in developing countries could use 
Bitcoin as a method for transferring funds, while avoiding the excessively high remittance 
payments. Id.  
 65. See Doguet, supra note 57, at 1130–31.  
 66. Nicholas A. Plassaras, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin within the 
Reach of the IMF, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 337, 387 (2013) (“In other words, the maximum number 
of Bitcoins in circulation is finite. Given the rate at which the success of Bitcoin mining slows, 
Bitcoin generation is estimated to come to halt in 2025.”). Note discrepancy with European 
Cent. Bank, supra note 28, at n.59 and accompanying text (noting date of cap as 2040). This 
discrepancy is likely due to increased mining levels, which explains the reduction in the 
predicted year the Bitcoin cap will be reached.  
 67. J.P. & G.T., Bits and Bob, ECONOMIST (June 13, 2011), http://www.economist.com/ 
blogs/babbage/2011/06/virtual-currency. 
 68. James Wyss, Bitcoin Price 2013: Digital Currency is the Future of Payments, 
POLICY.MIC (May 17, 2013), http://www.policymic.com/articles/42629/bitcoin-price-2013-
digital-currency-is-the-future-of-payments. An essential criticism regarding Bitcoin’s immunity 
to inflationary pressures is that, on the flipside, it may be prone to deflation, which tends to be a 
destructive force in modern economics. See Salmon, supra note 5. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/14
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015]  A Regulatory and Economic Perplexity 185 
 
 
C. Challenges For Mainstream Acceptance 
Although Bitcoin has increasingly become an attractive alternative 
to legal tender currencies, it suffers from fundamental flaws that are 
detrimental to its widespread adoption. First and foremost, 
governments are highly concerned about Bitcoin’s susceptibility to 
criminal activity.
69
 Because Bitcoin offers varying degrees of 
anonymity to its users, digital currencies have been increasingly 
associated with money laundering and other criminal activities.
70
 One 
of the most prominent examples is Silk Road, a digital black market 
where Bitcoin was used exclusively to buy and sell illegal drugs.
71
 
Prior to the website’s shut down, the market used a combination of 
 
 69. See generally FBI INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT, supra note 20 (describing the FBI’s 
concern that Bitcoin’s nature as a decentralized digital currency attracts cyber criminals and is a 
useful tool for illegal activity in general).  
 70. See, e.g., E.J. Fagan, Op-Ed., Bitcoin and International Crime, BALTIMORE SUN (Nov. 
25, 2013), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-bitcoin-20131125,0,326 
5347.story (“By largely eliminating intermediaries, bitcoin allows individuals to conduct 
transactions without being subject to anti-money laundering controls, which makes it an 
attractive currency to criminals—particularly those who prey on the weak.”). Bitcoins, 
however, are not completely untraceable or anonymous. But see JERRY BRITO & ANDREA 
CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS 9 (2013), available at http://mercatus.org/ 
sites/default/files/Brito_BitcoinPrimer_v1.3.pdf  
In reality, it is very difficult to stay anonymous in the Bitcoin network. Pseudonyms 
tied to transactions recorded in the public ledger can be identified years after an 
exchange is made. Once Bitcoin intermediaries are fully compliant with bank secrecy 
regulations required of traditional financial intermediaries, anonymity will be even less 
guaranteed, because Bitcoin intermediaries will be required to collect personal data on 
their customers. 
See also ELWELL ET AL., supra note 53, at 3 (stating that sophisticated computer analysis can 
track large Bitcoin transactions on the public ledger).  
 71. Adrian Chen, The Underground Website Where You Can Buy Any Drug Imaginable, 
GAWKER (June 1, 2011), http://gawker.com/the-underground-website-where-you-can-buy-any-
drug-imag-30818160; Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Seizure of Additional $28 Million 
Worth of Bitcoins Belonging to Ross William Ulbricht, Alleged Owner and Operator of “Silk 
Road” Website, FBI NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.fbi.gov/ newyork/ 
press-releases/2013/manhattan-u.s.-attorney-announces-seizure-of-additional-28-million-worth-
of-bitcoins-belonging-to-ross-william-ulbricht-alleged-owner-and-operator-of-silk-road-website 
(“During its approximately two-and-a-half years in operation, Silk Road was used by several 
thousand drug dealers and other unlawful vendors to distribute hundreds of kilograms of illegal 
drugs and other unlawful goods and services to well over a hundred thousand buyers, and to 
launder hundreds of millions of dollars derived from these unlawful transactions. All told, the 
site generated sales revenue of more than 9.5 million Bitcoins and collected commissions from 
these sales totaling more than 600,000 Bitcoins.”).  
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anonymity enhancing technology and sophisticated user-feedback to 
enable its users to freely buy and sell illegal drugs.
72
  
The price volatility of Bitcoin also raises concerns. For example, 
its value ranged significantly from the beginning of 2013, priced at 
$13.28 per bitcoin to $1,147 in early December 2013.
73
 The inability 
to convert bitcoins into any specific basket of physical goods or 
commodities could be a factor affecting its price volatility.
74
 
Bitcoin’s volatility is particularly problematic because it makes 
pricing goods and services in bitcoins difficult; this exposes Bitcoin 
users to substantial exchange rate risks that make the currency less 
attractive for widespread use.
75
 Nevertheless, some have argued that 
Bitcoin is not inherently volatile, but rather, that its volatility is a 
product of its newness.
76
 If that is the case, then Bitcoin’s volatility 
will decrease with its increased use and popularity.  
 
 72. Id.  
 73. Bitcoin Price Index Chart, COINDESK, http://www.coindesk.com/price/ (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2014) (To find the appropriate table, go to the tab labeled “Price” located on the upper 
portion of the screen, then select “Bitcoin Price Index.” A chart indicating Bitcoin price 
fluctuations will appear below. On the upper right hand side of the chart, you will find two 
boxes to input a date range. Select January 1, 2013 in the first box and December 31, 2013 in 
the second box. The CoinDesk BPI Exchange is the table used for this purpose since it shows 
the highest value when compared to the other exchanges represented on the website for that 
period.).  
 74. Johannes Tynes, Bitcoin: A Future with Digital Currencies, MONEY HACKER (Aug. 
29, 2013), http://www.moneyhacker.com/195/bitcoin-a-future-with-digital-currencies/.  
 75. Radoslav Albrecht, Bitcoin Volatility: The 4 Perspectives, BITCOIN MAG. (Aug. 27, 
2013), http://bitcoinmagazine.com/6543/bitcoin-volatility-analysis/. Albrecht argues, however, 
that Bitcoin’s volatility is in decline. Id. As the Bitcoin market becomes increasingly capitalized 
and each Bitcoin is worth more, the less ones’ trades will impact the market price. Id. Plus, the 
more users there are, price volatility will be reduced. Id. Therefore, Albrecht optimistically 
concludes that price volatility decline means greater success for Bitcoin’s mainstream adoption. 
Id. Note also that instead of using bitcoins as a currency, they could be used entirely as a 
payment system (medium of exchange), whereby merchants can trade in bitcoin (avoiding 
excessive transaction costs) without ever holding on to the currency. Andreessen, supra note 
43. As such, where payments are made using Bitcoin, the merchant or consumer can 
immediately switch the received bitcoins back into fiat currency. Andreessen, supra note 43.  
 76. Jerry Brito, Houman Shadab & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin Financial Regulation: 
Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Markets & Gambling 13 (Aug. 10, 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=243461 (“Additionally, as a nascent currency, it is very thinly traded 
and as a result a single large-enough trade can affect the exchange price substantially. Positive 
news, such as major retailers announcing they will accept the currency, can make the price 
jump dramatically, while negative news, such as unfavorable regulatory pronouncements, can 
send the price plummeting.”). 
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Bitcoin’s particular characteristics have also incentivized users to 
hoard the coins, thereby treating Bitcoin as an investment rather than 
as a means of exchange.
77
 This incentive to hoard results from the 
future limited supply of bitcoins,
78
 which is due to the system’s 
capping mechanism.
79
 Bitcoin’s limited supply helps it improve its 
stored value, but people may predict that the price will continue to 
rise, giving them an incentive to hold the coins instead of spending 
them in the market.
80
 As such, Bitcoin behaves more like a highly-
volatile commodity.
81
  
Bitcoin has also been criticized for its lack of security and users’ 
inability to bring claims against the wrongdoing party. Bitcoins, 
stored in ones’ personal wallet or in a third party wallet service, are 
subject to hard drive failures, malware, and user errors.
82
 Holding 
bitcoins requires a strong encryption scheme and good backup 
system.
83
 One small error could wipe out a user’s bitcoin holdings 
overnight.
84
 Users relying on a third party wallet service must also be 
aware of its shortcomings and potential for fraudulent use. Given the 
lack of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) equivalent 
for Bitcoin, users who have lost coins have no means of redress.
85
  
Additionally, Bitcoin’s adoption as a mainstream currency is 
hindered because storing and acquiring the coins requires great 
computational capacity. Every node in the network must download a 
copy of every transaction that has taken place, so that as more people 
join the system, every transaction becomes more resource-intensive.
86
 
To prevent transactions from becoming too large, Bitcoin limits the 
 
 77. Tynes, supra note 74. 
 78. Id.; See also Doguet, supra note 57, at 1130–31 
 79. Jan Reess-Alaric, supra note 50.  
 80. Tynes, supra note 74. 
 81. Salmon, supra note 5.  
 82. Timothy B. Lee, Four Reasons You Shouldn’t Buy Bitcoins, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2013/04/03/four-reason-you-shouldnt-buy-bitcoins/.  
 83. Lee, supra note 82.    
 84. Id.; See also Cameron Keng, Bitcoin’s Mt. Gox Goes Offline, Losses $409M—
Recovery Steps and Taking your Tax Losses, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
cameronkeng/2014/02/25/bitcoins-mt-gox-shuts-down-loses-409200000-dollars-recovery-steps-
and-taking-your-tax-losses/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2015) (describing Mt. Gox’s, one of the largest 
Bitcoin exchanges, shutdown due to a security breach).  
 85. Lee, supra note 82.   
 86. Id. 
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size of each block.
87
 Currently, Bitcoin transactions are far below the 
limit, but as the network grows, it will have difficulty effectively 
dealing with such volume.
88
  
Moroever, given Bitcoin’s decentralization, all those using the 
system need to agree on any change by voluntarily updating their 
software.
89
 This is relatively unproblematic so long as the network 
remains small and focused, yet presents a concern for further 
development and improvement of the currency.
90
 
Some have argued that Bitcoin’s biggest detriment is conceptual, 
in that its success is closely tied to its potential failure.
91
 That is, 
Bitcoin’s value depends on a network; the more people who join the 
network, the higher the value of the Bitcoin,
92
 but the more prone it is 
to hyperdeflation.
93
 If Bitcoin succeeds, an increasing number of 
goods and services will be traded in Bitcoin, but the increase in 
Bitcoin demand will outpace the rate of increase in the supply of 
bitcoins given their limited supply,
94
 causing Bitcoin’s value to rise.95 
Therefore, the number of bitcoins per each unit of goods and services 
will fall, triggering deflation.
96
 Felix Salmon, a prominent early 
 
 87. See Timothy B. Lee, Bitcoin Needs to Scale by a Factor of 1000 to Compete with 
Visa, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/ 
wp/2013/11/12/bitcoin-needs-to-scale-by-a-factor-of-1000-to-compete-with-visa-heres-how-to-
do-it/ (noting that each block is limited to one megabyte).  
 88. Id. Currently, the Bitcoin network can process around seven transactions per second. 
Id. Right now, only about one transaction per second is taking place. Id.  
 89. Tynes, supra note 74.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Salmon, supra note 5.  
 92. The people on the network determine the value of the currency; so as long as people 
continue to buy into the system, the value of the currency will grow. Elizabeth Gillis 
(producer), See Why Bitcoin is Not Likely to be the Currency of the Future, PUB. RADIO INT’L 
(Oct. 4, 2013, 2:15 PM), http://www.pri.org/stories/2013-10-04/why-bitcoin-not-likely-be-
currency-future.  
 93. See id. (noting that the more Bitcoin rises in value, the value of the goods and services 
priced in bitcoins declines. For example, a gold bar priced at $600,000 at $60 per bitcoin has a 
value of $10,000 in bitcoin. If the price of Bitcoin rises, however, say to $6,000, then the value 
of the gold bar in bitcoins declines to 100 bitcoins.).     
 94. Yanis Varoufakis, Bitcoin and the Dangerous Fantasy of ‘Apolitical’ Money, 
TRUTHDIG (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/bitcoin_and_the_dangerous_ 
fantasy_of_apolitical_money_20131226.  
 95. Salmon, supra note 5.  
 96. In a deflationary environment, everything from goods to services, in Bitcoin terms, 
would decrease in value. Salmon, supra note 5. In such an environment, no one spends his or 
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adopter and commentator on Bitcoin, has claimed that because 
Bitcoin cannot achieve monetary growth, it cannot sustain an 
economy and therefore cannot become a widely used currency.
97
  
Ultimately, however, what will truly define Bitcoin’s future is a 
clarification of the legal and regulatory framework surrounding it. 
Legally categorizing Bitcoin will have substantial ramifications on 
the future use of digital crypto-currencies. 
II. REGULATORY LANDSCAPE 
A. FinCEN Regulations 
On March 18 2013, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN), a branch of the US Department of the Treasury, issued 
guidelines regarding the administration, exchange, and use of virtual 
currencies.
98
 FinCEN’s Virtual Currency Guidance clarifies the 
applicability of the existing Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), in particular 
regarding Money Services Businesses regulations,
99
 to “persons 
 
her money because there is near certainty that something will be cheaper tomorrow or the next 
week or next month as the value of the currency continues to rise. Salmon, supra note 5. 
 97. Salmon, supra note 5. Some have argued that Bitcoin should be unaffected by the 
problem of hyper-deflation because its users will be able to anticipate it. Doguet, supra note 57, 
at 1131. If people think the value is going to rise, then they will bid the price up immediately, 
which means there will never really be a significant period where people are simply hoarding 
their bitcoins in anticipation of a future price rise. See Timothy B. Lee, Bitcoin Doesn’t Have a 
Deflation Problem, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2013/ 
04/11/bitcoin-doesnt-have-a-deflation-problem/. Furthermore, some have said Bitcoin will not 
lead to deflation unless countries’ governments demanded that everyone switch over to Bitcoin 
in the next ten years. See Leigh Drogen, Is Bitcoin a Commodity, Currency, or Technology?, 
(Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.leighdrogen.com/is-bitcoin-a-commodity-currency-or-technology/. 
In that case, if Bitcoin does become widespread, then there will be no reason to hoard since 
everyone will be using it and there will only be marginal extra demand. Id.  
 98. See generally DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 
Guidance Paper FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS 
ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013), available at 
http://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf [hereinafter FinCEN Guidance 
Paper]; see also Treas. Order 180-01 (Mar. 24, 2003) (giving FinCEN authority to administer 
the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)).  
 99. The BSA subjects financial institutions and Money Services Businesses (MSBs) to a 
wide range of anti-money laundering obligations. See J. Dax Hansen et al., New FinCEN 
Guidance Changes Regulatory Landscape or Virtual Currencies and Some Prepaid Programs, 
PERKINS COIE (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/03_22_2013_TTP_ 
Update.PDF. MSBs falling under the BSA must establish strict anti-money laundering 
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creating, obtaining, distributing, exchanging, accepting or 
transmitting virtual currencies.”100 The guidelines declare these 
entities to be subject to the rules governing money transmission.
101
 
The guidelines did not, however, specify how the currency itself 
should be classified. Rather, they clarified the regulatory atmosphere 
for those specifically transacting in Bitcoin. 
FinCEN’s guidance is cause for concern for some Bitcoin users 
because the guidelines subject Bitcoin exchangers and administrators 
(defined as those who put bitcoins into circulation as well as 
withdraw them from circulation)
102
 to the increased costs of 
compliance associated with money transmitting regulations. 
Exchangers are subject to both state and federal licensing 
requirements.
103
 On the federal level, registration requires only filing 
an application.
104
 On the state level, however, the process is infinitely 
more complex.
105
 Moreover, because Bitcoin functions on the 
Internet and is accessible in every state, a Bitcoin exchanger must 
register with all those states requiring licensing in order to comply 
with the regulations, further adding to the cost of doing business.
106
   
 
programs; file currency transaction reports and suspicious activity reports; and implement 
know-your-customer (KYC) programs. Id. Most types of MSBs require registration with 
FinCEN. Id.  
 100. FinCEN Guidance Paper, supra note 98, at 1.  
 101. Id. The guidance, pursuant to the MSB regulations defines ‘money transmission 
services’ as “the acceptance of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency from 
one person and the transmission of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency 
to another location or person by any means.” Id. at 3. Money Transmitting businesses are 
regulated pursuant to the BSA as well as parts of the Patriot Act. See USA Patriot Act of 2001, 
18 U.S.C. § 1960(a) (2006) (“Whoever knowingly conducts, controls, manages, supervises, 
directs, or owns all or part of an unlicensed money transmitting business, shall be fined in 
accordance with this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”).  
 102. FinCEN Guidance Paper, supra note 98, at 1.  
 103. Marco Santori, Bitcoin Law: Money Transmission on the State Level in the US, 
COINDESK (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-law-money-transmission-state-
level-us/.  
 104. Id.  
 105. See id. (noting excessive state licensing procedures).  
 106. Id.  
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B. Defining Bitcoin’s Classification and Future: District Court Judge 
Concludes that “Bitcoin is Money” 
In SEC v. Shavers, a Texas federal judge recently declared that 
Bitcoin is in fact money.
107
 The question was introduced to a Texas 
federal district court in a case regarding a Bitcoin ponzi scheme run 
by an individual named Trendon Shavers.
108
 The issue arose as the 
court questioned its jurisdiction in the case under the Securities Act 
of 1993 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
109
 Resolution of the 
jurisdictional question rested upon whether the Bitcoin investments 
constituted an investment of money.
110
  
In order to have jurisdiction under the Securities and Exchange 
Acts, the court had to conclude that Bitcoin was in fact a security. 
The court defined a security as “any note, stock, treasury stock, 
security future, security-based swap, bond [or investment contract 
. . . .”111 It specifically defined an investment contract as “any 
contract, transaction, or scheme involving three factors: (1) an 
investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; and (3) with the 
expectation that profits will be derived from the efforts of the 
promoter or a third party.”112 
 
 107. SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13CV416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).  
 108. Id. at *1. Shavers is the founder and operator of Bitcoin Savings and Trust (BTCST). 
Id. The SEC alleges that he offered and sold Bitcoin-denominated investments through the 
Internet, and offered his investors up to 7 percent weekly interest based on BTCST’s market 
arbitrage activity. See id. In reality, the investment opportunity was a Ponzi scheme in which 
Shavers used the Bitcoin provided by the new investors to make purported interest payments 
and cover investor withdrawals on outstanding BTCST investments. Id.  
 109. Id. at *1. These acts regulate the securities market. While the Securities Act of 1933 
overlooks information given to the public with regards to public security offerings as well as 
prohibits fraud and misrepresentations in the market, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gives 
the SEC broad authority over all other areas of the securities market such as registration and 
regular reporting. See The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/ 
about/laws.shtml (last visited Aug. 25, 2014).  
 110. Id. at *2. Money is an intangible that serves three purposes: (1) it is a store of value; 
(2) it is a unit of account (common measure of value); and (3) it is a medium of exchange. 
Functions of Money—The Economic Lowdown Podcast Series, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. 
LOUIS (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.stlouisfed.org/education_resources/economic-lowdown-
podcast-series/ functions-of-money/.  
 111. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77b) (the statute refers to the 
definition of a security).  
 112. Id. (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey & Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946) and Long v. 
Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 132 (1989)). This three-pronged test is referred to as the 
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The court concluded that Bitcoin “can be used as money” because 
goods and services can be purchased with bitcoins, it can be used to 
pay living expenses, and it can be exchanged for conventional 
currencies.
113
 The court recognized, however, that Bitcoin’s 
acceptance in only a handful of places limits its use as money, but 
determined that Bitcoin was nonetheless a “currency or form of 
money” because it can be exchanged for conventional currencies.114  
After concluding that Bitcoin is an investment of money, the court 
analyzed the remaining elements of an investment contract, finding 
that Bitcoin investments “meet the definition of investment contract, 
and as such, are securities.”115 It determined that a common enterprise 
existed because the investors depended on Shavers’ expertise in the 
Bitcoin market, and he promised a substantial return on their 
investments as a result of his trading of bitcoins.
116
 Moreover, the 
court also found that the plaintiff met the third factor: expectation of 
profit. During the venture, Shavers promised interest between 1 
percent to almost 4 percent, from which it is clear that the investors 
were expecting profits from Shavers’ efforts.117  
 
Howey Test.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. The court in this decision only ruled on the jurisdictional question, concluding that 
it had jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. Id. The District Court later ruled on the actual scheme, stating that there 
was a violation of the acts because “Shavers knowingly and intentionally operated BTCST as a 
sham and a Ponzi scheme, repeatedly making misrepresentations to BTCST investors and 
potential investors concerning the use of their bitcoins; how he would generate the promised 
returns; and the safety of the investments.” SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13CV416, 2014 WL 
4652121 at *8 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014). The former decision is important because it could 
help define certain circumstances under which the SEC could regulate Bitcoins. For example, 
purchasing Bitcoins as a speculative investment and intending to profit off of a future sale of 
those Bitcoins could classify the transaction as a security. See Todd P. Zerega & Thomas H. 
Watterson, United States: Regulating Bitcoins: CFTC vs. SEC?, MONDAQ (Jan. 2, 2014), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/283878/Commodities+Derivatives+Stock+Exchanges/
Regulating+Bitcoins+CFTC+vs+SEC.  
 116. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2. To show a common enterprise, the Fifth Circuit 
has required interdependence between the investors and the promoter, demonstrated by the 
collective reliance on the promoter’s expertise. Id. (quoting Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 
129, 141 (1989)). The test looks at whether the investor subjects his money to the risk of an 
enterprise over which he has no managerial control. John William Nelson, Why Bitcoin Isn’t a 
Security Under Federal Securities Law, LEX TECHNOLOGIAE, http://www.lextechnologiae.com/ 
2011/06/26/why-bitcoin-isnt-a-security-under-federal-securities-law/. 
 117. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2.  
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The Shavers decision shows one court’s initiative in further 
delineating Bitcoin’s regulatory landscape, but its ruling warrants a 
word of caution. The court’s holding that bitcoins are money and that 
Shaver’s scheme is an investment contract is somewhat limited.118 As 
Judge Mazzant acknowledged, bitcoins are not yet widely used as a 
medium of exchange.
119
 Perhaps bitcoins can be classified as money 
only in the particular circles that take them as payment and in 
circumstances such as Shavers’ Ponzi scheme.  
More importantly, it is not quite clear why bitcoins are a store of 
value. The economist, Paul Krugman argues that a reliable store of 
value is a currency that is either backed by a central authority, like 
the dollar, which is backed by the US Treasury, or has some form of 
intrinsic value, such as gold being made into jewelry.
120
 Krugman has 
expressed skepticism that a currency that is neither backed by a 
central authority nor holds intrinsic value will retain its value over 
time.
121
 Bitcoin also does not make interest payments and no 
investment interest is denominated in Bitcoin at the moment, which 
also seems to suggest that its role as a store of value is somewhat 
limited.
122
  
Furthermore, there are those who have argued that Bitcoin should 
not be considered a currency. To be a currency, Bitcoin must be a 
store of value and a means of exchange.
123
 Commodities historically 
backed most currencies (commodity-currency) but now state 
 
 118. One could argue that Bitcoin in and of itself does not satisfy the requisite elements for 
a security classification. See infra notes 133–38 and accompanying text.  
 119. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2. 
 120. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Bitcoin Is Evil, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2013), http://krugman. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/28/bitcoin-is-evil/?_r=0. 
 121. Id.; but see Adrianne Jeffries, Why Don’t Economists Like Bitcoin?, THE VERGE (Dec. 
31, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/31/5260534/krugman-bitcoin-evil-economists  
“If Bitcoin is successful, it could prove that money doesn’t need to function as a stable 
store of value . . . . Its success could also prove that use as a medium of exchange can 
be the basis for believing a currency is a store of value. If people believe that they will 
be able to buy things with Bitcoin and exchange it for other currencies indefinitely, 
that could convince them to use it as a store of value.”  
 122. Woo et al., infra note 214, at 8 (“From this point of view, as a store of value, its 
closest cousins are probably precious metals or cash . . . in our view.”).  
 123. John Authers, Time to Take the Bitcoin Bubble Seriously, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2013), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4ad1bba0-61fa-11e3-aa02-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2pZf9xP1n.  
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governments almost exclusively back currencies (fiat currency).
124
 
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that currency 
is defined as “the coin and currency of the United States or of any 
other country, which circulate in and are customarily used and 
accepted as money in the country in which issued.”125 Opponents of 
Bitcoin as a currency reason that it is not backed or issued by any 
government, unlike the US Dollar, which is backed by the US 
Treasury’s ‘full faith and credit’, and no one is legally required to 
accept Bitcoin.
126
 Further, its value rests only on perception.
127
   
Despite possible shortcomings, the Shavers decision illuminates 
Bitcoin’s potential uses and possible classification schemes. More 
importantly, the decision is the first to have determined and clarified 
the nature of the use of Bitcoin in a Ponzi scheme scenario.
128
 It is not 
unfathomable that based on this decision, broader and more sweeping 
regulatory declarations may occur in the future.
129
  
 
 124. See Arthur J. Rolnick & Warren E. Weber, Money, Inflation, and Output Under Fiat 
and Commodity Standards, 105 J. POL. ECON. 1308, 1309 (1997), available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/10.1086/516394.pdf?&acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true  
Under commodity standards, governments minted coins and issued paper currency that 
represented promises to specified amounts of specie. After the change in standards, 
governments issued fiat money: token coins and paper currency that carried no 
promise of either present or future convertibility into gold, silver, or anything else of 
intrinsic value. 
 125. California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 39 n.14 (1974) (citing 31 CFR 
§ 103.11 (reserved by 75 FR 65806-01)) 
 126. Authers, supra note 123 (“Where does this leave us? Foreign exchange analysts agree, 
mostly off the record, that Bitcoin is not worthy of being treated as a real currency.”).  
 127. Authers, supra note 123; but see Jay Yarow, Why Bitcoin Has Value, According to 
One of Its Biggest Supporters, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
why-bitcoin-has-value-2014-1 (describing Bitcoin as having value because it gives users the 
ability to send payments, property and contracts anywhere in the world immediately and in a 
reliable manner).  
 128. Christopher B. Hopkins, What is Bitcoin: Currency, Property . . . or Tulips?, 
TECHNOLOGY CORNER (June 2014) 13, available at http://www.internetlawcommentary.com/ 
articles/2014_bitcoin_tulip.pdf.  
 129. See Will Blackton, Mining for Federal Regulation: What Does SEC v. Shavers Mean 
for the Future of Bitcoin?, N.C. J.L. & TECH. (Oct. 15, 2013), http://ncjolt.org/mining-for-
federal-regulation-what-does-sec-v-shavers-mean-for-the-future-of-bitcoin/ (“The entire Bitcoin 
economy might not be disqualified from wholesale securities regulation because every 
participant is an investment promoter.”).  
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C. Bitcoin as a Security  
Furthermore, although the Shavers decision indicates that in one 
particular instance, Bitcoin can be used as a type of security, the court 
failed to address whether Bitcoin itself could be a security. Although 
in the United States a security instrument is broadly defined,
130
 
Bitcoin in and of itself fails to clearly fall within this broad 
definition.
131
 
If Bitcoin were classified as a security, it would likely be analyzed 
under the Howey Test detailed below.
132
 What makes classifying 
Bitcoins as a security complex, however, is that many of its 
characteristics point in either direction. For instance, the test’s first 
prong, investment of money, is easily satisfied if one views it as a 
user purchasing bitcoins on an exchange.
133
 On the flip side, bitcoins 
are also acquired through mining and therefore only require an 
investment of computer processing power rather than money
134
 If this 
is the case, Bitcoin would fail the first prong of the test. Furthermore, 
Bitcoin users do not gain profits from a single promoting entity 
because the system lacks a central authority,
135
 however, users do 
enter the network with the common goal of continuing the block 
chain.
136
 Moreover, whether there is a common expectation of profits 
also depends on whether Bitcoin is used as a payment mechanism or 
system of exchange, or rather, as a speculative vehicle.
137
 The latter 
would satisfy the Howey Test, while the former would fail it. Finally, 
the last prong may actually be the most certain in indicating Bitcoins 
 
 130. See supra note 111, and accompanying text.  
 131. Vesna Harasic, It’s not Just about the Money: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Regulatory Status of Bitcoin under Various Domestic Securities Laws, AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 
487, 495 (2014).   
 132. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. As a reminder, the following are the 
prongs of the Howey Test: (1) an investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; and 
(3) with the expectation that profits will be derived from the efforts of the promoter or a third 
party. Id.  
 133. Harasic, supra note 131.  
 134. Nelson, supra note 116.  
 135. Id.     
 136. Harasic, supra note 131. Furthermore, the network could classify as a horizontal 
commonality as the future of all Bitcoin users are tied together. Harasic, supra note 130. 
Nevertheless, there is arguably no vertical commonality as the development and expectation of 
profits is not tied a single promoter. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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non-classification as a security. That is, the Howey Test requires an 
expectation of profits derived from the efforts of another. Bitcoin’s 
very framework prevents any one person from exercising managerial 
control over the entire system.
138
 
Consequently, Bitcoin’s status as a security remains unclear, but 
will likely continue to be a source of potential regulation depending 
on Bitcoin’s further development.  
D. Bitcoin as a Commodity 
So far, the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC)
139
 has not issued any ruling or guidance regarding Bitcoin as 
a commodity,
140
 yet the regulatory entity is currently considering 
whether Bitcoin falls under its jurisdiction.
141
 At the moment, most 
Bitcoin transactions currently do not fall within the CFTC’s 
purview.
142
 However, given Bitcoin’s volatility, there is great interest 
 
 138. Nelson, supra note 116. Note, however, that Bitcoin users have begun to form mining 
pools that could lead to the creation of a controlling group. See Johnson, infra note 144. What is 
concerning about the creation of a controlling block of users is that they could create their own 
block chain. Joel Hruska, One Bitcoin Group now Controls 51% of Total Mining Power, 
Threatening the Entire Currency’s Safety, EXTREMETECH (June, 2014), http://www.extreme 
tech.com/extreme/184427-one-bitcoin-group-now-controls-51-of-total-mining-power-threatening-
entire-currencys-safety. This control happens when a mining pool creates what is known as an 
orphan block, which does not belong in the regular chain. Id. The network identifies it as an 
orphan block and throws it out by comparing it against the chain that has been worked on the 
most. Id. However, if a group can achieve 51% or more control, then it can create its own chain 
and throw more resources into that chain. Id. A mining pool controlling 51% or more of the 
network therefore has the ability to block or reject transactions or drive other pools out of 
business. Id. Consequently, if a portion of the Bitcoin network becomes controlled in this 
regard, it may well cause Bitcoin to satisfy the last prong of the Howey Test.  
 139. The CFTC is the entity in charge of overseeing and policing the derivatives markets to 
“protect market participants and the public from fraud, manipulation, abusive practices and 
systematic risk related to derivatives . . .” See Mission and Responsibilities, CFTC 
http://www.cftc.gov/about/missionresponsibilities/index.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2014).  
 140. See Armand Tanzarian, Legal Basics: Owning and Using Bitcoin in the United States, 
COINTELEGRAPH (June 6, 2014), http://cointelegraph.com/news/111713/legal_basics_owning_ 
and_using_bitcoin_in_the_united_states.  
 141. See Andrew Ackerman, CFTC Studying Jurisdiction over Bitcoin, MONEY BEAT 
(Mar. 11, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/03/11/cftc-studying-jurisdiction-over-
bitcoin/.  
 142. See infra note 144 and accompanying text. However, the commissioner of the CFTC, 
Timothy Massad, recently told a Senate Committee that the CFTC would oversee any Bitcoin 
related futures and swaps as the CFTC has authority to regulate futures and swaps in any 
commodity. He said, “While the CTFC does not have policies and procedures specific to virtual 
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in using various forms of financial instruments, particularly a variety 
of derivative contracts, such as swaps, as a way of hedging those 
risks.
143
 
In the United States a commodity is understood to be a “useful 
thing; an article of commerce; a moveable and tangible thing 
produced or used as the subject of barter or sale.”144 In this sense, 
bitcoins are clearly commodities because they are useful articles of 
commerce that are capable of being possessed.
145
 Bitcoins are traded 
online for goods and services, and even though every node on the 
Bitcoin network is knowledgeable of the bitcoins contained in each 
wallet, the individual user is the only one capable of distributing the 
coins within his or her particular wallet.
146
  
Furthermore, the CFTC, under the Commodities Exchange Act 
(CEA), classifies commodities in three different categories: 
(1) agricultural commodities, which, as the name indicates, include a 
number of agricultural products, such as wheat;
147
 (2) excluded 
commodities, which refer to a number of financial interests including 
interest rates, currencies, price indices, etc.;
148
 and (3) exempt 
commodities,
149
 which encompasses everything not covered by the 
other two categories and includes metals, and energy.
150
 Bitcoins 
 
currencies like bitcoin, the agency’s authority extends to futures and swaps contracts in any 
commodity . . . derivative contracts based on a virtual currency represent one area within our 
responsibility.” Joon Ian Wong, CFTC Chairman: We have Oversight of Bitcoin Derivatives, 
COINDESK (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.coindesk.com/cftc-chairman-oversight-bitcoin-
derivatives/.  
 143. Houman B. Shadab, Regulating Bitcoin and Block Chain Derivatives 2 (Oct. 9, 2014), 
available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/gmac_100914_ 
bitcoin.pdf.  
 144. J. Thomas Johnson III, What U.S. Regulations Apply to Bitcoin as Commodities?, 
BITCOIN TITAN & TRADING TITAN (Feb. 17, 2012), http://blog.bitcointitan.com/post/17789738 
826/what-u-s-regulations-apply-to-bitcoins-as-commodities (citing Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 
and State ex rel. Moose v Frank, 169 S.W. 333 (Ark. 1914)). 
 145. Id. (noting that Bitcoins are tangible because they are constructively possessed, 
meaning one has control over a property without actual possession).  
 146. Id.  
 147. See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9). 
 148. See CEA § 1a(19), 7 U.S.C. § 1a(19) (defining “excluded commodity” as including a 
variety of financial interests). 
 149. CEA § 1a(20); CFTC Glossary, Exempt Commodity 
 150. See Exempt Commodity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/exempt 
_commodity.asp (last visited Sept. 6, 2014). Note that there is a different regulatory regime in 
the case of foreign exchange. See Latham & Watkins, Regulation of Foreign Currency 
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certainly fall under one of these three classifications and are 
consequently commodities under the CEA; however, which category 
they belong to (excluded commodities—as bitcoins can be viewed as 
a currency, or exempt commodities—as bitcoins may meet the 
definition of a metal and anything that does not fall under the first 
two categories, may fall under this category) is debatable.
151
  
The CFTC has “exclusive jurisdiction [over those] transaction[s] 
commonly known to the trade as, an ‘option,’ . . . ‘bid,’ ‘offer,’ ‘put,’ 
‘call,’ and transactions involving swaps or contracts of sale of a 
commodity for future delivery.”152 Despite this definition, the CFTC 
has specified that the term “future delivery” does not include 
commodities futures contracts.
153
 This exclusion refers specifically to 
forward contracts.
154
 That is, the CFTC does not regulate forward 
contracts,
155
 but rather, regulates speculative investments, including 
futures contracts
156
 and options.
157
 Moreover, under the CEA, 
 
Transactions: The Interaction of the Treasury Determination, Swaps Regulation and the Retail 
Foreign Exchange Rules, CLIENT ALERT NUM. 1468 2 (Feb. 13, 2013), available at 
file:///Users/danisonderegger/Downloads/us-treasury-regulation-foreign-currency-transactions. 
pdf. (noting that foreign exchange (FX) swaps and FX Forwards are exempted from the CEA’s 
definition of a swap, however, FX options may still fall under the CEA’s definition of a swap).   
 151. See Brito et al., supra note 76, at 18 (discussing why Bitcoin can fall under any one of 
the three classifications and is therefore a commodity as defined by the CEA).  
 152. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2012).  
 153. See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(27) (2012) (“The term ‘future 
delivery’ does not include any sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment or delivery”) 
(emphasis added). It is worth noting that the difference between a future contract and forward 
contract is primarily how the transaction is conducted.  
 154. A forward contract is one in which the “parties agree to trade an asset at a later date at 
a price specified in the present.” See Brito et al., supra note 76, at 19 (citations omitted). 
Forward contracts are particularly tailored to the specific risks involved in the negotiated 
transactions and are not traded on centralized exchanges. Brito et al., supra note 76, at 19. .  
 155. Forward contracts are not regulated by the CFTC because the CFTC oversees 
speculative markets, rather than those in which the commodity actually has some “inherent 
value” to the parties. Brito et al., supra note 76, at 19. That is, in a Forwards contract, the 
parties traditionally transfer ownership of the commodity, rather than simply transferring the 
commodity’s price risk. Brito et al., supra note 76, at 20.  
 156. A futures contract is defined by the CFTC as “an agreement to purchase or sell 
a commodity for delivery in the future: (1) at a price that is determined at initiation of the 
contract; (2) that obligates each party to the contract to fulfill the contract at the specified price; 
(3) that is used to assume or shift price risk; and (4) that may be satisfied by delivery or offset.” 
Futures Contract, CFTC Glossary, CFTC, http://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/Education 
Center/CFTCGlossary/index.htm#F (last visited Sept. 6, 2014). A party selling Bitcoin would 
use a futures contract in Bitcoin to protect themselves from Bitcoin’s price volatility by taking a 
“short” position (meaning they believe Bitcoin price will go down with respect to the dollar) 
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“options on commodities fall within the definition of a ‘swap,’158 and 
are consequently usually regulated as such.
159
 The key is to determine 
whether Bitcoin transactions are either forward contracts or option 
contracts subject to the CFTC’s jurisdiction.160  
 The first step in deciding whether a contract is a forward contract 
or an option hinges on whether the parties had a general expectation 
of delivery of the underlying commodity.
161
 In most Bitcoin 
transactions, the buyer intends to accept delivery of the bitcoins sold.  
 
and agreeing to sell Bitcoin at that particular price. See Brito et al., supra note 76, at 15. The 
distinction between futures and forwards is not statutorily defined, but rather hinges on a 
totality of the circumstances test. The test differentiates the two on the following grounds: 
“forwards are non-standardized, do not trade on an exchange, and . . . are intended by the 
parties to physically deliver the commodity as opposed to a cash settlement of the market versus 
contract price difference.” Brito et al., supra note 76, at 20  (citing Forward contract, CFTC 
Glossary, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Education Center, accessed March 27, 
2014, http://www.cftc.gov/consumerprotection/educationcenter/cftcglossary/); See also In re 
National Gas Distributors, 556 F.3d 247 (9th Cir 2009); CFTC v. Hanover Trading Corp., 34 F. 
Supp. 2d 203 (S.D.N.Y 1999) (contracts where no delivery was contemplated were futures)).  
 157. See Johnson, supra note 143 (“Forward contracts (a subset of futures contracts) are 
transferable contractual agreements to buy or sell a fixed amount of a certain commodity on a 
specified date; options contracts are the right to buy or sell a specified amount of a commodity 
within a certain period of time at a given price (called the strike price).”) (citation omitted). 
There are two kinds of options: a call option, which has value only if the purchase price is 
below the market price, and a put option, which works in the opposite way of a call option. 
Brito et al., supra note 76, at 26. In terms of Bitcoin, if a purchaser buys a call option it would 
allow the seller selling in Bitcoin price denominations to be protected in the event of an 
increase in price. Brito et al., supra note 76, at 26. On the other hand, a put option would protect 
in the event of a price decline because it allows the option holder to sell at the pre-specified 
price. Brito et al., supra note 76, at 26.  
 158. A swap is defined as an agreement “in which each counterparty agrees to an exchange 
of payments related to the value or return of some underlying asset or event.” See Shadab, 
supra note 143, at 8.   
 159. See Shadab, supra note 143, at 8. The CFTC has jurisdiction over most types of 
swaps, including fx swaps, interest rate swaps and other commodity swaps, which differ from 
the exclusive jurisdiction the SEC has on some swaps, namely, swaps based on securities and 
other some narrow-based indices. Id. A Bitcoin swap swap would likely be in the form of an 
FX swap, which entails two parties borrowing a foreign currency from each other and agreeing 
to pay each other back at a specified price or may entail the parties agreeing to a cash-
settlement rather than an actual exchange of the currencies. Id. Such a swap would be used to 
hedge against the risk of a price decrease relative to the dollar, for instance. Id.  
 160. Brito et al., supra note 76, at 26. 
 161. Id. (citing In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 
(CFTC Dec. 6, 1979)). The other two factors courts have looked at include: (1) directed 
operation to the general public; and, (2) standardized contracts, which resemble futures 
contracts. Id. 
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Currently, there are a few websites that sell Bitcoin forward 
contracts; yet, they do not have any of the characteristics of an 
options contract.
162
 In order for the CFTC to have jurisdiction over 
the transaction, there must be trade in the contract, and the seller 
accepts a cash settlement over physical delivery.
163
 Currently, these 
Bitcoin transactions are physically settled, meaning the buyer must 
receive the bitcoins bargained for, and the price of the contract is the 
price of the bitcoins and not a premium for the option to buy bitcoins 
at some later time. Additionally, profit is realized when bitcoins are 
received and exchanged, not when the rate increases beyond the 
strike price and the paid premium.
164
 Consequently, most Bitcoin 
transactions do not currently fall under the CFTC’s purview.165  
It is possible, however, that Bitcoin future contracts sold by large 
mining pools, where individual miners pool their computational 
strength together to mine for bitcoins, may become standardized. 
These contracts, where the sellers are primarily miners or mining 
pools, are not likely to fall under the CFTC’s regulatory authority for 
the reasons previously mentioned
166
 However, if a market emerges 
where buyers may resell the contracts, or use swaps as a means of 
hedging foreign exchange risks, those transactions will certainly fall 
under the CFTC’s jurisdiction because, in such an event, the buyer 
will not take delivery of the commodity.
167
 So long as buyers take 
delivery of the commodity and do not become sellers, then the main 
prong distinguishing a forward contract from an option contract is 
 
 162. Johnson, supra note 144. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. OkCoin in China is the first exchange to launch a futures trading. See Jon 
Southurst, China Exchange OkCoin to Launch Bitcoin Futures Trading, COINDESK (Aug. 5, 
2014), http://www.coindesk.com/okcoins-bitcoin-futures-trading-aims-combat-price-volatility-
risk/. At the moment, the exchange is seeking business with other countries, including the US 
Id. If such type of futures trading begins to occur in the US, particularly Bitcoin swaps, the 
CFTC will most likely have authority to regulate these transactions, as they no longer involve 
actual delivery of the bitcoins, but will now involve speculation of the cryptocurrency’s 
performance without physical delivery of the bitcoins. See supra notes 157–63 and 
accompanying next.  
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satisfied, rendering these transactions outside of the CFTC’s 
regulatory purview.
168
  
E. Other State and Federal Regulations  
At the moment, other federal regulatory entities as well as state 
governments are analyzing how to regulate Bitcoin. For its part, Janet 
Yellen, the chair of the Federal Reserve, has said that the Federal 
Reserve does not have the ability to supervise or regulate Bitcoin 
given that there is no intersection between Bitcoin and banks.
169
 On 
the other hand, earlier this year, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
issued a notice about the treatment of Bitcoin for tax purposes.
170
 The 
IRS said that it will treat payments made with bitcoins, Bitcoin 
investments, and income derived from mining, as property, and they 
will be taxed accordingly.
171
 The Federal Election Commission has 
also considered regulating Bitcoin in the realm of campaign 
contributions.
172
 Finally, New York recently issued proposed 
regulations for a “BitLicense” plan which would be applied to 
companies that store, maintain, or secure virtual currencies on behalf 
of customers, and which would be intended to create a 
comprehensive framework to ensure consumer protection, 
particularly with respect to money laundering and cybersecurity.
173
   
 
 168. See supra notes 157–61 and accompanying next. .  
 169. Vivian A. Maese, Divining the Regulatory Future of Illegitimate Cryptocurrencies, 18 
NO. 5 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC. ELEC. AGE 7 (2014).  
 170. See Keith A. Aqui, IRS Notice 2014-21 2 (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf (noting that Bitcoin shall be treated as property for tax purposes, and 
will not be treated as a currency).  
 171. See Jose Pagliery, IRS says Bitcoin is Taxable, CNN MONEY (Mar. 25, 2014), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/25/technology/innovation/irs-bitcoin/index.html.  
 172. See Brito et al., supra note 76, at 11 (citing Benjamin Goad, FEC: No bitcoins in 
federal campaigns, THE HILL (Nov. 21, 2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/regwatch/technology/ 
191096-fec-no-bitcoins-in-federal- campaigns.). 
 173. See Sydney Ember, New York Proposes First State Regulations for Bitcoin, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 17, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/lawsky-proposes-first-state-
regulations-for-bitcoin/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0; See generally Title 23. Department of 
Financial Services. Chapter 1. Regs. Of Superintendent of Financial Services Part 200. Virtual 
Currencies, available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press2014/pr1407171-vc.pdf.  
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F. Regulatory Reactions to Bitcoin in Other Countries 
Bitcoin has been received with mixed enthusiasm by governments 
around the world. Some have welcomed Bitcoin with open arms. For 
example, Belgium’s government has not specifically regulated 
Bitcoin, and its Minister of Finance has indicated that at the moment 
regulation seems unnecessary.
174
 Further, the United Kingdom’s 
Financial Conduct Authority has told Coinfloor, a Bitcoin exchanger, 
that it has no plans to regulate Bitcoin exchanges.
175
 Germany 
declared Bitcoin to be private money, meaning it could be used for 
tax and trading purposes in the country.
176
 Finland has said Bitcoin is 
a commodity and not a currency. However, Finns can use the 
commodity as a means of exchange and to make payments.
177
 
Similarly, the Japanese government has stated that Bitcoin is a 
commodity, but disallowed financial institutions and banks from 
handling Bitcoin trades.
178
 On a similar note, The People’s Bank of 
China has essentially disallowed financial institutions from handling 
 
 174. See Regulation of Bitcoin in Selected Jurisdictions, Library of Congress, 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/bitcoin-survey/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) 
 175. Jerry Brito, U.S. Regulations Are Hampering Bitcoin’s Growth, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 
18, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/18/bitcoin-senate-hearings-
regulation. 
 176. Matt Clinch, Bitcoin Recognized by Germany as ‘Private Money’, CNBC (Aug. 19, 
2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100971898. 
 177. See People’s Bank of China and Other Five Ministries Issued “On Guard Against the 
Risk of Bitcoin Notice” (Translated version of Official Statement) (Dec. 5, 2013), 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/goutongjiaoliu/524/2013/20131205153156832222251/2013120
5153156832222251.html [hereinafter Official Statement]; Kati Pohjanpalo, Bitcoin Judged 
Commodity in Finland After Failing Money Test, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 2014-01-19/bitcoin-becomes-commodity-in-finland-after-
failing-currency-test.html; Cameron Fuller, Bitcoin vs. Bank of Finland: Cryptocurrencies 
Ruled as Commodities After Failing Money Test, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/bitcoin-vs-bank-finland-cryptocurrencies-ruled-commodities-after-
failing-money-test-1545072  
While Finland has declared it a commodity, Finns can still use it to pay for goods and 
services. Additionally, any income generated via capital gains is taxed, though losses 
are not deductible, and bitcoin mining gains are taxable as income. Ultimately, the 
Finnish bank’s position marks any investment into the currency as a risk that citizens 
take on their own. 
 178. Japan to Regulate Bitcoin Trades, Impose Taxes, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (Mar. 5, 2014), 
http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Japan-to-regulate-Bitcoin-trades-impose-
taxes.  
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Bitcoin transactions.
179
 China’s treatment of Bitcoin is particularly 
important because China has rapidly become one of Bitcoin’s biggest 
markets.
180
  
In December 2013, the Chinese government issued a statement 
regarding Bitcoin. It found: (1) Bitcoin is not a currency, but rather 
will be treated as a virtual asset/digital commodity; (2) financial 
institutions and payment companies may not engage in Bitcoin 
related businesses; (3) buying and selling of online commodities is 
allowed and people are free to do so (i.e., exchanges are legal), but 
goods and services cannot be priced and paid for in bitcoins; (4) the 
government will exercise increased oversight of Bitcoin-related 
websites and it will act to prevent money laundering risks associated 
with Bitcoin; and (5) the public must assume Bitcoin’s risk since it is 
a speculative asset.
181
 The Chinese government’s policy implements 
“broad restrictions from a very macro-level, not blindly try to 
regulate a market in its infancy.”182 
G. Implications of Current Regulatory Framework 
Although the Bitcoin market is still small,
183
 it is clear that there is 
little consensus as to how to regulate Bitcoin. In the United States, 
regulation has focused on money laundering and money 
 
 179. Rebecca Brace, China Leads Fresh Regulatory Response to Bitcoin Bubble, 
EUROMONEY (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3291898/China-leads-fresh-
regulatory-response-to-Bitcoin-bubble.html.  
 180. See Vitalik Buterin, Baidu Jiasule and the Chinese Bitcoin Community, BITCOIN 
MAG. (OCT. 16, 2013), http://bitcoinmagazine.com/7492/baidu-jiasule-and-the-chinese-bitcoin-
community/ (stating economic and cultural reasons why Bitcoin has become so popular in 
China); Coinsider This! Show 12—Bitcoin in China, COINSIDER THIS! (Dec. 12, 2013), 
http://www.coinsiderthis.com/2013/12/12/coinsider-this-show-12-bitcoin-in-china/ http://www. 
coinsiderthis.com/tag/regulation/(noting that over 50% of worldwide Bitcoin trading is 
denominated in RMB, the Chinese currency).  
 181. See Official Statement, supra note 177. 
 182. Jack Wang, China’s Statement on Bitcoin Is Open to Interpretation, COINDESK (Dec. 
16, 2013), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-china-statement-interpretation/ (quoting S, owner 
of Yibite, a Bitcoin media operated by some of the top miners and holders in China).  
 183. The value of available Bitcoins currently totals approximately $12 billion. Peter J. 
Henning, For Bitcoin, Square Peg Meets Round Hole Under the Law, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 
2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/for-bitcoin-square-peg-meets-round-hole-under 
-the-law/. 
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transmission,
184
 and less so on consumer protections
185
 and the 
Bitcoin system’s actual classification. If Bitcoin continues to grow, 
clearer regulatory guidelines may be necessary, particularly with 
regard to its classification as a currency, a commodity, or some other 
kind of asset.  
III. ANALYSIS 
Based on Bitcoin’s uncertain nature, governments could develop a 
host of regulations. Nevertheless, it would be unwise for them to 
implement strict regulations at this time. Rather, the US government 
should emulate some elements of the Chinese policy, with one major 
distinction; goods and services should be priced in Bitcoins, and 
users shall be permitted to use Bitcoin as a payment mechanism. As 
such, this note advocates for the United States to adopt a mixed 
policy incorporating elements of both the Chinese and Finish/models 
with respect to Bitcoin. Such a combined model would allow Bitcoin 
to mostly self-regulate within a vague framework that both legally 
defines Bitcoin while ultimately allowing it the regulatory freedom it 
requires to fully develop.  
Bitcoin is ultimately a self-regulated system based on a 
mathematical peer-to-peer network that exists on the Internet, and it 
can continue to fully develop only if permitted this regulatory 
freedom. Nonetheless, Bitcoin will never reach its full potential if 
lawful businesses fail to see it as legitimate.
186
 The US government 
 
 184. See supra discussion Part II.A and accompanying text.  
 185. See The Present and Future Impact of Virtual Currency: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. & Int’l Trade & Fin. & the Subcomm. on Econ. Policy of the S. Comm. 
on Banking, 113th Cong. 6 (2013) (statement of Mercedes Tunstall, Partner, Ballar Spahr), 
available at http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&File 
Store_id=e6d78e44-fb96-4cd0-b17d-40d89e50f8aa  
Currently, consumer protections contained in financial regulations such as the 
Electronic Funds Transfer Act and its implementing regulation, Regulation E, do not 
apply to virtual currencies. Therefore, unauthorized transactions involving virtual 
currency have no recourse –once the currency is gone, it is gone, just as surely as when 
someone swipes bills from a wallet. 
 186. See Marc Ferranti, Bitcoin Regulation Urged by Law Enforcement Officials at New 
York Hearing, PCWORLD (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2092780/bitcoin-
regulation-urged-by-law-enforcement-officials-at-new-york-hearing.html (despite some legitimate 
uses of Bitcoin, challenges faced, particularly in regards to its criminal underpinnings, result in 
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should take a hands-off approach to Bitcoin, while keeping a close 
eye on the criminal activity, regulating and prosecuting only when 
absolutely necessary.
187
 Self-regulation within this vaguely defined 
legal framework is the preferred path because: (1) Bitcoin is already a 
self-regulated system; (2) harsh regulation could send Bitcoin 
overseas, leaving the United States out of the regulatory discussion; 
and (3) Bitcoin may come crashing down in an instant. Such a 
modified self-regulating framework will allow the government to 
monitor Bitcoin developments, while giving the market the 
confidence it needs to allow Bitcoin to follow its true course.  
A. Bitcoin is Inherently Self-Regulating 
Bitcoin was conceived as system that is distrustful of central 
authority. More than a medium of exchange or a possible currency, 
Bitcoin is an open source protocol that can be molded and built upon 
by its users, thereby exhibiting self-regulating qualities.
188
 Bitcoin 
users must consent to system changes, as the system is regulated in a 
formulaic and mathematical fashion.
189
 These particular qualities, 
based on network acceptance and adoption of change, make Bitcoin 
an inherently self-regulated system.  
Because the system is flexible and based on community adoption, 
it is unlikely that a government will be successful in implementing 
regulation. Bitcoin thrives on its strong network effects, meaning the 
currency with the largest user base is the most useful one and 
 
significant interest by legitimate businesses in the outcome of discussions over Bitcoin’s 
regulation).  
 187. As Felix Salmon said, “for the time being, bitcoin is in many ways the best and 
cleanest payments mechanism the world has ever seen. So if we’re ever going to create 
something better, we’re going to have to learn from what bitcoin does right—as well as what 
it does wrong.” Salmon, supra note 5.  
 188. See, e.g., David, Wolman, Bitcoin’s Radical Days are Over. Here’s How to Take It 
Mainstream, WIRED (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2013/10/bitcoin/ 
(highlighting the importance of Bitcoin’s open source and malleability as support for its 
potential for mainstream adoption).  
 189. David Perry, Democratic Currency: Why Bitcoin Is So Hard to Regulate, CODING IN 
MY SLEEP (Nov. 20, 2013), http://codinginmysleep.com/democratic-currencywhy-bitcoin-hard-
regulate/. Proposals implemented in the software must be taken up by 80% of the nodes before 
they become permanent. Bitcoin Under Pressure, ECONOMIST (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www. 
economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21590766-virtual-currency-it-mathematically-elegant-
increasingly-popular-and-highly. 
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therefore it entrenches its position as the most popular.
190
 This means 
more processing power is dedicated to the system, thereby increasing 
security and making it difficult for regulators to intervene with the 
process.
191
 Even if the US government could implement regulation, 
the simple fact that Bitcoin exists on the Internet means that the rest 
of the world can ignore US imposed regulation, cutting the United 
States off of the Bitcoin economy.
192
  
B. Consequences of the Current Regulatory Environment in the 
United States 
If Bitcoin is self-regulated, there are valid concerns regarding the 
criminal activity underlying many Bitcoin transactions. To ameliorate 
these concerns, the Bitcoin community
193
 has attempted to find code-
based solutions to the problem.
194
 Currently, however, the Bitcoin 
 
 190. Timothy B. Lee, Everything You Need to Know About the Bitcoin ‘Bubble’, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/08/ 
everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-bitcoin-bubble/ http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
the-switch/wp/2013/11/08/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-bitcoin-bubble/http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/08/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-
bitcoin-bubble/. 
 191. Jerry Brito, Bitcoin Is Going Mainstream. Here Is Why Cypherpunks Shouldn’t Worry, 
TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (Oct. 31, 2013), http://techliberation.com/2013/10/31/bitcoin-is-
going-mainstream-here-is-why-cypherpunks-shouldnt-worry/.  
 192. Perry, supra note 189.  
 193. See Chris Moody, Meet the People Trying to Make Bitcoin Happen in Washington, 
YAHOO NEWS (June 2, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/bitcoin-lobbyists-212631321.html  
(mentioning a number of players that form part of the Bitcoin community, including, the 
Bitcoin Foundation, the Mercatus Center, the Digital Asset Transfer Authority, etc.). Besides 
these foundations, the Bitcoin community is made up of a number of entrepreneurs, like the 
Winklevoss twins, as well as a number of startups and other online/e-commerce businesses. See 
William Channer, Winklevoss Twins: Why Bitcoin will be Bigger than Facebook, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 19, 2014) (describing the Winklevoss twins’ investment and interest in 
Bitcoin); See also Ian Kar, What Companies Accept Bitcoin? (Feb. 4, 2014), 
http://www.nasdaq.com/article/what-companies-accept-bitcoin-cm323438 (listing a number of 
companies that accept bitcoins as payment).   
 194. For example, “Autonomous agents are software programs able to scan large amounts 
of financial transactions for irregularities; potentially, they can even halt a transaction from 
being processed.” Doguet, supra note 57, at 1145. Another proposed code based solution is to 
blacklist stolen coins in order to prevent them from re-entering the money supply. Jonathan 
Levin, Governments Will Struggle to Put Bitcoin Under Lock and Key, CONVERSATION (Nov. 
27, 2013, 2:35 PM), http://theconversation.com/governments-will-struggle-to-put-bitcoin-
under-lock-and-key-20731. Blacklisting is feasible because every Bitcoin transaction is publicly 
announced on the block-chain so the network could find a way of agreeing whether the coins 
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system is unable to prevent small-scale criminal activity from taking 
place, as evidenced by numerous hackings of bitcoin wallets, large-
scale sale of drugs, as well as other illegal activity.
195
  
Nevertheless, Bitcoin’s strength lies in the system’s ability to 
adapt and become increasingly secure with time.
196
 Assuming that 
more and more users on the network routinely use Bitcoin for 
legitimate purposes, it is fathomable (based on the network effects 
just described) that the system will become stronger and code based 
changes addressing these criminal concerns will be widely accepted.  
Although Bitcoin may evolve into a stronger, more protected 
system in the future, criminal activity is nonetheless taking place 
now. This makes a strong argument against self-regulation. What is 
more, Jerry Brito, a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at 
George Mason University, has noted that due to the way bitcoins are 
created, “there is no Bitcoin company to raid, subpoena or shut 
down.”197  
Yet, evidence seems to suggest that this threat is overstated.
198
 As 
previously discussed, Bitcoin transactions are not completely 
 
were actually stolen. Id. Note, however, that this proposal is problematic because it could result 
in taking a large number of coins out of the system, and burdening individual merchants with 
checking coins against a blacklist, which is something that is not even done with fiat currency. 
Danny Bradbury, Anti-Theft Bitcoin Tracking Proposals Divide Bitcoin Community, COINDESK 
(Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-tracking-proposal-divides-bitcoin-community/. 
Yet another proposal aiming at regulating Bitcoin’s software weaknesses suggests that Bitcoin 
be regulated by something similar to the SEC Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity 
(SCI) system, which is aimed at controlling software ‘glitches’ in the securities system together 
with a self-regulatory entity that is to oversee Bitcoin activity. Maese, supra note 169   
 195. Two of the biggest online black markets for the sale of illicit goods, Silk Road and 
Sheep Marketplace, transacted almost exclusively in Bitcoin. See Bitcoin—Reward Comes with 
Risk—Part Four, DORSEY (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.dorsey.com/eu_cm_bitcoin_virtual_ 
currency_pt4/. Moreover, in mid-2011, a large Japanese based Bitcoin exchanger was the 
victim of a large cyber attack that knocked the value of the currency down from $17.50 to 
$0.01. Id. Other attacks include the theft of almost $1 million worth of Bitcoins from Inputs.io, 
a website owned by Bitcoin payment processor TradeFortress, and the overnight disappearance 
of Global Bond Limited, a Hong Kong-registered Bitcoin trading platform, that absconded with 
$4.1 million in investor assets. Id.  
 196. ‘Without Third Party, Bitcoin Is Safer than Fed Notes’, RT (Nov. 9, 2013), 
http://rt.com/op-edge/bitcoin-theft-strong-currency-465/.  
 197. Peter Twomey, Halting a Shift in the Paradigm: The Need for Bitcoin Regulation, 16 
TRINITY C.L. REV. 67, 75 (2013) (internal citations omitted). Note, however, that the likelihood 
is that the users themselves, rather than a Bitcoin entity, are the malfeasors.  
 198. A recent study suggests that it is pretty hard to use Bitcoins to launder money on a 
large scale. See Sarah Meiklejohn et al., A Fistful of Bitcoins: Characterizing Payments Among 
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anonymous because they exist on a public ledger. Furthermore, law 
enforcement personnel have the tools to trace these transactions and 
capture the wrongdoing party.
199
  
Even if Bitcoin may not be the tool of choice for many criminals, 
crime through Bitcoin has undeniably occurred.
200
 Exchangers have 
been targeted as a means of regulating this criminal activity.
201
 
Exchangers, unlike other aspects surrounding Bitcoin transactions, 
are real business entities, incorporated in the United States, where 
digital currency is exchanged for fiat currency.
202
 The United States 
has proven it has the power to control and regulate this aspect of the 
Bitcoin industry,
203
 yet it should continue to do so cautiously, 
implementing only that regulation necessary to protect consumers 
and further help delineate the regulatory framework. Furthermore, 
lawmakers have expressed that the US Department of Justice has the 
tools to prosecute criminal Bitcoin transactions under the current 
regulatory framework.
204
  
 
Men with No Names, PROC. OF THE CONF. ON INTERNET MEASUREMENT 127, 128 (2013), 
available at http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~smeiklejohn/files/imc13.pdf (“[T]he increasing dominance 
of a small number of Bitcoin institutions (most notably services that perform currency 
exchange), coupled with the public nature of transactions and our ability to label monetary 
flows to major institutions, ultimately makes Bitcoin unattractive today for high-volume illicit 
use such as money laundering.”).  
 199. See e.g., Elaine Silvestrini, Law Enforcement Cracking Bitcoin Black Markets, TAMPA 
TRIB. (Feb. 2, 2014) (noting numerous cases in Florida involving Bitcoin conspiracies and 
criminal activity, and law enforcement’s ability to trace transactions); see also ELWELL ET AL., 
supra note 53, at 3 (stating that law enforcement officials have powerful software tools to track 
Bitcoin activity).  
 200. See Reward Comes with Risk—Part Four, supra note 195 (describing hackings of 
Bitcoin wallets and other Bitcoin criminal activities).  
 201. Twomey, supra note 197, at 76.  
 202. Id. 
 203. See also FBI INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 2 (“[T]he FBI assesses 
with medium confidence that law enforcement can identify, or discover more information about 
malicious actors if the actors convert their bitcoins into a fiat currency.”).  
 204. Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the 
US Department of Justice, said the criminal statutes on the books seem to be sufficient to 
prosecute the man recently arrested for running Silk Road and that the Department has been 
successful using existing money laundering statutes to prosecute other digital currency money 
laundering cases, such as EGold and Liberty Reserve. Joshua Brustein, Currency Cops Want 
Congress to Steer Clear of Bitcoin, Thanks, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 19, 2013), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-11-19/currency-cops-want-congress-to-steer-clear-
of-bitcoin-thanks.  
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Exclusively regulating Bitcoin exchangers strikes a sufficient 
balance between the need to protect Bitcoin users from criminal 
activity and ensuring the freedom Bitcoin requires to properly grow 
and develop. Nevertheless, some Bitcoin exchangers have responded 
to regulation by blocking US users from their system.
205
 If the United 
States is not careful in the way it regulates and prosecutes Bitcoin 
criminal activity, it may be shut out of the Bitcoin regulatory 
discussion.
206
 Regulation that is too strong will only send Bitcoin 
users overseas, further removing it from the reach of US 
regulation.
207
 Given these risks and Bitcoin’s ability to adapt, the 
United States should interfere only when absolutely necessary to 
safeguard the public’s interests.  
C. Bitcoin’s Possible Failure  
Bitcoin should also be permitted to self-regulate because of the 
threat that the system may collapse in the near future. There are a 
number of potential failures that could occur in the foreseeable 
future. First, Bitcoin has no guaranteed demand.
208
 Second, Bitcoin 
 
 205. For example, BitFunder, a Bitcoin stock exchange, banned people in the United States 
from using the site on October 8, 2013, as a means of better avoiding US long arm statutes. 
Kadhim Shubber, Bitcoin Stock Exchange BitFunder Announces Closure, COINDESK (Nov. 12, 
2013), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-stock-exchange-bitfunder-announces-closure/.  
 206. Up until recently, the United States had been central to Bitcoin’s growth. Brito, supra 
note 175. In fact, Bitcoin’s lead developer, Gavin Andresen, is an American and is employed by 
the Bitcoin Foundation, which is based in the United States. Id. Moreover, some of the most 
innovative Bitcoin startups are also based in the United States. (e.g., Bitpay and Coinbase). Id. 
But, the US regulatory approach (regulate first and ask questions later) has stymied some of this 
growth, as new startups or exchangers prefer opening in areas with more lax regulations. Id. For 
example, Coinfloor, a new exchanger, recently opened in London and the Bitcoin Foundation is 
reportedly considering moving its headquarters overseas. Id. 
 207. FinCEN’s most recent actions on January 6, 2014, seem to further alienate Bitcoin 
businesses from the United States. FinCEN mailed roughly a dozen letters to businesses linked 
to Bitcoin, warning that they may fall within the definition of money transmitters and may be 
required to comply with federal law and regulations. Brett Wolf, U.S. Treasury Cautions 
Bitcoin Businesses of Compliance Duties, Advocate Cites ‘Chilling Effect’, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 
2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2014/01/06/u-s-treasury-cautions-
bitcoin-businesses-on-compliance-duties-advocate-cites-chilling-effect/. The letters, with their 
threat of civil and criminal sanctions for non-compliance have had a chilling effect on 
businesses. Id.  
 208. See Joshua Gans, Time For a Little Bitcoin Discussion, ECONOMIST’S VIEW (Dec. 25, 
2013), http://www.relooney.info/000_New_265.pdf (stating that Bitcoin, unlike the US dollar 
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could become vulnerable as a result of over-speculation which could 
ultimately cause an irrecoverable crash. In addition, Bitcoin could be 
threatened by the emergence of a new currency making it obsolete, or 
users abandoning it for some other reason.
209
 Opponents argue that 
Bitcoin is in a bubble from which it will not recover once the bubble 
bursts,
210
 and the computational power required to support the system 
is currently straining at the seams.
211
 Should this be true, the cost of 
regulation far outweighs the costs of self-regulation.
212
 If Bitcoin 
 
has no guaranteed minimum demand because the US government does not take Bitcoin as 
payment for taxes).  
 209. Jeffries, supra note 121 (describing numerous reasons why Bitcoin may fail).  
 210. In the past year, Bitcoin’s value surged from $13, reached a high of $1147 on 
December 4, 2013, and finished the year at $757. Bitcoin Price Index Chart, supra note 73 (to 
access, download the historical price data excel document). 
 211. According to The Economist, the mining system has led to an “unsustainable 
computational arms-race” because as equipment gets faster, mining gets harder. Bitcoin Under 
Pressure, supra note 189. But faster equipment is constantly being developed, which reduces 
the potential rewards for other miners unless they also buy more computational power. Id. 
Additionally, because the reward for mining a block halves about every four years, the reward 
will drop from twenty-five to twelve and a half Bitcoins sometime in the year 2017. Id. If the 
reward declines, so, it seems, would the incentive to continue to verify the integrity of the 
block-chain. See id. Moreover, every participant in the system must keep a copy of the block 
chain, which currently exceeds eleven gigabytes, deterring casual use. Id. Finally, volunteer 
machines or nodes, which relay transactions and transmit updates to the block-chain, are 
necessary for the system’s survival, yet there is no compensation for those who maintain the 
nodes. Id. The cost of Bitcoin is ultimately tied to the cost of mining: “[w]hen the (expected) 
value of a Bitcoin is below the cost of mining it, none will be produced and the value of Bitcoin 
will rise.” Gans, supra note 208. 
 212. Furthermore, it is worth noting that people or more specifically, large financial 
institutions, tend to socialize their losses and privatize their gains. See Rana Foroohar, The Myth 
of Financial Reform, TIME, Sept. 23, 2013, at 31 available at http://content.time.com/time/ 
subscriber/article/0,33009,2151806,00.html (describing the “too big to fail” concept that led to 
the bailout of large financial institutions in the United States after engaging in risky 
investments). It is possible that if the US government were to become heavily involved in 
regulating the Bitcoin market and if a bubble occurs, consumers and industry players alike will 
seek the government’s aid in times of loss. See generally Peter T. Treadway, Privatize the 
Gains, Socialize the Losses, BIG PICTURE (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2010/ 
02/privatize-the-gains-socialize-the-losses/. (Describing failure of our monetary system, in 
particular the ‘socialize the loss and privatize the gain’ oriented economy, where the 
government absorbs the losses). Presently, the Bitcoin market is not big. As of February 2, 
2014, there were a little over twelve million Bitcoins in circulation, at a market capitalization of 
$11,644,555,870. Market Capitalization, BLOCK CHAIN, https://blockchain.info/charts/market-
cap?timespan=30days&showDataPoints=false&daysAverageString=1&show_header=true&sca
le=0&address= (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). But, if the market continues to grow, this concern 
may become more prevalent. Therefore, it is advisable the government stay relatively out of it, 
lest it face another housing bubble type situation.  
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faces an inevitable demise, there is little point in investing resources 
and efforts in devising sophisticated regulations only to see the 
system entirely collapse.  
However, even if Bitcoin is in a bubble the entire system may not 
collapse. It can still be a useful store of wealth or medium of 
exchange.
213
 Experts have said that it fills a market need by 
facilitating e-commerce as a payment method.
214
 If, or until the 
bubble bursts, however, Bitcoin will continue to be a speculative 
investment, and it is only once the market crashes that “we’ll see 
whether it [Bitcoin] has legs.”215 The way Bitcoin may be used after 
its potential crash, if at all, will help regulators further define the 
appropriate legal framework. Until then, or until there is some sign 
Bitcoin has become more stable, governments should mostly sit tight 
and allow Bitcoin to develop.  
D. Ideal Regulatory Solution: Adoption of a Combined Regulatory 
Model  
Finally, this Note proposes that self-regulation in the world we 
currently live in cannot fully function without some regulatory 
guidance. As such, this Note proposes that the US government may 
benefit from emulating some elements of China’s current regulatory 
approach as well as incorporating aspects of the Finnish model. As 
described above, by defining Bitcoin as a commodity rather than a 
currency, the Chinese policy implements a vague legal framework 
that gives Bitcoin users a workable legal definition of the technology. 
However, this Note advocates that unlike the Chinese model, the US 
should by no means restrict goods and services from being priced in 
Bitcoin and should allow use of Bitcoin similar to that the Finish and 
model has permitted.  
 
 213. Tim Worstall, Yes Of Course Bitcoin Is Showing Bubble Behaviour, FORBES (Nov. 19, 
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/11/19/yes-of-course-bitcoin-is-showing-
bubble-behaviour/. 
 214. David Woo et al., Bitcoin: A First Assessment, BANK OF AM. MERRILL LYNCH 1 (Dec. 
5, 2013), available at http://cryptome.org/2013/12/boa-bitcoin.pdf.  
 215. Caitlin Fitzsimmons, Why Bitcoin Could Succeed Where Facebook Credits Failed—
Even After the Bubble Bursts, BUS. REV. WKLY. (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.brw.com.au/ 
p/tech-gadgets/bubble_bitcoin_could_succeed_where_7DW6j1z2gZo7ZegicC7xPO (quoting 
Jonathan Kelly, PayPal head of retail services).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
212 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 47:175 
 
 
With respect to the Chinese policy, the US government should 
emulate the following elements: (1) provision of a vague legal 
framework by defining what Bitcoin is, namely, a commodity and not 
a currency; (2) removal of financial intermediaries from participating 
in the Bitcoin economy; (3) transfer of risk to those directly 
participating in the Bitcoin economy, i.e., the users themselves; and, 
(4) the government’s maintenance of power to track and protect 
against money laundering or other Bitcoin related criminal activities. 
Nevertheless, emulating the Chinese approach to its full extent would 
completely stifle Bitcoin innovation and development. Emulating the 
Finish model which classifies Bitcoin as a commodity, but allows 
goods and services to be priced in Bitcoin, is therefore of 
fundamental importance.  
 Such a framework would allow the government to monitor Bitcoin 
activity, while at the same time allow the system to continue to 
develop relatively freely. By not defining Bitcoin as a currency, the 
Chinese government restricts it from being used as a payment 
mechanism, but avoids having to define it within current currency 
control regulations.
216
 What is more, by defining Bitcoin as a 
commodity but prohibiting financial intermediaries from meddling 
with Bitcoin, the Chinese government diverts Bitcoin’s risks to the 
users themselves.
217
 However, by restricting merchants from pricing 
goods and services in Bitcoin, the Chinese policy completely restricts 
Bitcoin from being used as a payment mechanism and instead pushes 
it into the realm of a speculative commodity. Consequently, 
permitting the pricing of goods in Bitcoin, as the Finish policy 
suggests, is necessary for Bitcoin to achieve its full potential as a 
payment mechanism.  
Bitcoin, even classified as a commodity, as done in Finland and 
Japan, can be used as a payment protocol or a means of exchange.
218
 
Users pricing goods in bitcoins and accepting the commodity are put 
 
 216. See Coinsider This! Show 12—Bitcoin in China, supra note 180.  
 217. Ryan Whitwam, China Bans Bitcoin, Lowering the Ceiling of the Currency’s 
Potential, EXTREMETECH (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.extremetech.com/internet/172187-china-
bans-financial-institutions-from-dealing-in-bitcoin. China also has an interest in safeguarding 
its monetary control policies, which function to keep its currency from increasing in value. Id. 
Bitcoin, on the other hand, has increased tremendously in value. Id.  
 218. See Pohjanpalo, supra note 177.  
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on notice of the commodity’s risk but can also take measures to avoid 
that risk simply by using the software as a means of exchange. Users 
can accept bitcoins at the current exchange rate and immediately 
convert the bitcoins received into their preferred fiat currency.
219
 At 
the moment, companies exist that will price in US currency, and 
when they receive payment in bitcoins, they deposit an equivalent 
amount into the depositor’s bank account.220 As a consequence, it is 
these companies (and not the government or federal entities) as well 
as the user’s themselves that are accepting Bitcoin’s volatile 
exchange rate, which currently comes at a cost of a 1 percent 
transaction fee.
221
  
 I would argue that a regulatory approach combining these two 
models is temporarily beneficial in the United States, as it will allow 
users to continue using Bitcoin at the cost of assuming the risks of its 
volatile nature until Bitcoin becomes more stabilized.
222
 As Nassim 
 
 219. See Andreessen, supra note 43. Overstock.com is an example of a company that aids 
in this exchange. Overstock prices are in dollars, which means that when a person makes a 
payment in Bitcoin, Coinbase will accept the bitcoins and deposit the equivalent dollar amount 
in the person’s bank account. Brito et al., supra note 76, at 14. As a result, Coinbase is the 
entity accepting the risk of Bitcoin’s volatile exchange rate. Brito et al., supra note 76, at 14 
(citing Cade Metz, The Grand Experiment Goes Live: Overstock.com is Now Accepting 
Bitcoins, WIRED MAGAZINE (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.wired.com/business/2014/01/overstock-
bitcoin-live/). 
 220. See, e.g., Rob Wile, Bitcoin is Experiencing its Longest Stretch of Price Stability in a 
While, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-volatility-
slows-2014-1 (noting that Overstock.com, a retailer, uses such a method to avoid volatility 
risks, immediately converting its Bitcoins into USD). When Overstock.com, who prices its 
goods in dollars, receives bitcoins, it deposits them with Coinbase, a Bitcoin exchange, who 
will, in turn, deposit the equivalent dollar amount into Overstock’s bank account. See Brito et 
al., supra note 76, at 14. 
 221. Brito et al., supra note 76, at 14 (citing Cade Metz, The Grand Experiment Goes Live: 
Overstock.com Is Now Accepting Bitcoins, WIRED MAGAZINE (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www. 
wired.com/business/2014/ 01/overstock-bitcoin-live/. Note that this fee is lower than the 2.2% 
of credit card transaction fees. Id. (citing What fees does Coinbase charge for merchant 
processing?, COINBASE SUPPORT (Feb. 5, 2014), http://support.coinbase.com/customer/portal/ 
articles/1277919- what-fees-does-coinbase-charge-for-merchant-processing-. Note that Bitcoin, 
in certain circumstances, can move the cost of the transaction to both parties, i.e., the merchant 
and the buyer. That is, in the scenario where the buyer exchanges US dollars for bitcoins, rather 
than mines for his own, the buyer pays a 1 percent transaction fee for this exchange. When the 
merchant subsequently sells bitcoins in exchange for US dollars, the merchant must pay another 
1 percent transaction fee, for a total of a 2 percent transaction cost, which is shared between the 
buyer and the seller.   
  222. Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s discussion in the book Antifragile: Things that Gain from 
Disordier, is particularly insightful here because, as Taleb argues, “no stability, without 
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Nicholas Taleb has phrased it, “Light control works; close control 
leads to overreaction.”223 Once Bitcoin becomes much more stable, 
further regulation and inclusion of financial institutions and banks in 
the equation may be advisable. At this point, however, Bitcoin is 
much too young and risky for regulated financial institutions and 
banks to become involved.
224
 China’s solution, to the extent 
described, together with the Finnish model’s pricing of goods and 
services in Bitcoin is preferable at the moment because it gives 
Bitcoin the freedom it needs to develop and stabilize, prior to the 
government intervening and having to assume the risks. 
Taking such a combined regulatory approach will give the United 
States a tighter reign on the entire Bitcoin system. The government 
will have increased monitoring power. And it will have the regulatory 
authority it needs if and when it becomes necessary to exercise full-
fledged regulatory power, because it will already have established a 
working framework. Because the regulation is designed to be vague, 
regulatory entities that may have authority to the authority to regulate 
Bitcoin (like the Securities Exchange Commission or the CFTC) are 
not excluded from the debate but are not forced to act immediately 
either. More importantly, this vague legal framework will continue to 
 
volatility.” NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE THINGS THAT GAIN FROM DISORDER 107 
(2012). Taleb notes that systems benefit from some dose (but not too much) of volatility and 
confusion because a certain level of volatility exposes the risks and vulnerabilities inherent in 
the system, which causes fluctuations to have only a small impact on the system and 
consequently stabilize the system overall. Id. at 100–01. Taleb further argues that a system that 
artificially suppresses volatility, through some kind of intervention, is dangerous because it 
exhibits no visible risks. Id. at 106. Under such a system, variations are rare, but when they 
occur, they are extreme. Id. at 91. Under this logic, if regulation were introduced as a way of 
inhibiting fluctuations in the Bitcoin system, the system would be much more likely to 
catastrophically blow up sometime in the future. See id. at 106. Note, however, that Taleb does 
not argue for nonintervention (no regulation), but rather naïve intervention. Id. at 119. At this 
point in time, it seems as though intervention in the Bitcoin system would be the kind of naïve 
intervention Taleb has warned us about.     
 223. Id. at 100.  
 224. See generally EBA Opinion on Virtual Currencies (July 2014), available at 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014-08+Opinion+on+Virtual+ 
Currencies.pdf (Assessing the various risks inherent in virtual currency systems generally and 
recommending that regulated financial services (credit institutions, payment institutions, e-
money institutions) “should be discouraged from buying, holding or selling VC [virtual 
currencies]s,” which would shield these regulated entities from the risks of virtual currencies).   
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/14
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allow Bitcoin technology to freely develop without isolating it to 
unknown parts of the world.  
Regulating Bitcoin as a digital commodity unfortunately restricts 
its use as a full-fledged currency and likely subjects it to the CFTC’s 
regulations, when Bitcoins begin to be traded as options or futures 
contracts in the United States.
225
 Nevertheless, the proposed solution 
is proper because it does not fully inhibit the system’s development. 
Even as a commodity, the Bitcoin protocol can be used as a method 
of exchange. Furthermore, Bitcoin is currently utilized more as a 
speculative tool rather than a currency.
226
 Presently, its high 
volatility, resulting from speculative activity, has hindered Bitcoin’s 
general acceptance as a means of payment for on-line commerce,
227
 
but it is also this high volatility that has spurred interest in using 
Bitcoin as a commodity to hedge those risks.  
By defining Bitcoin as a commodity, the government will help 
steer Bitcoin’s course, and perhaps allow its price and use to stabilize 
within a specific setting. The proposed solution is obviously a short-
term solution and fails to determine what will happen in the long-
term. However, the beauty of this framework is that it allows both 
Bitcoin and the government the necessary flexibility for future 
development.  
This proposal assumes Bitcoin will continue to be used as 
something like a currency or commodity rather than as a purely 
speculative instrument. At the moment, Bitcoin’s price volatility 
together with other risks inherent in the system makes the use of 
financial instruments, such as derivatives, to hedge against these 
risks, highly appealing to Bitcoin users. But, these very same 
arguments support exclusion of financial institutions and banks from 
participating in Bitcoin, at least for the time being. As a consequence, 
China’s regulatory model, together with the Finish model’s 
modifications, is suitable for current Bitcoin development in the 
United States.  
 
 225. See Johnson, supra note 144; see also note 155 and accompanying text.  
 226. See Coinsider This! Show 12—Bitcoin in China, supra note 180.  
 227. See Albrecht, supra note 75.  
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CONCLUSION 
Given the major developments that need to be made to further 
understanding Bitcoin, it is uncertain whether one day you will be 
able to universally purchase your daily coffee in bitcoins. What is 
certain is that Bitcoin is an innovative technology that has caught the 
world’s attention, and has, if nothing else, become a highly disruptive 
technology. Sitting at the crossroads between political ideology and 
financial reform, Bitcoin begs regulators to question the very 
foundation upon which the current financial and economic systems 
rest.  
Regulation is a necessary friction, and given the potential 
disruption Bitcoin may cause, governments around the world will 
logically want to regulate it. But, given Bitcoin’s ideological and 
technological underpinnings, the success of the system requires a 
degree of regulatory freedom. Proper regulation will not stifle 
innovation but will allow the Bitcoin system to self-regulate within a 
vaguely defined regulatory framework.  
Numerous questions will remain and will arise as Bitcoin 
continues to develop, but given Bitcoin’s infancy, it is advisable the 
government not fully jump into regulation until Bitcoin is better 
understood. What is more, Bitcoin is a truly global phenomena. Its 
development and regulation will not take place domestically but will 
be fully realized only when the world comes together to define its 
status. 
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